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1.	  Introduction	  
	  805	  million	  people	  suffer	  from	  chronic	  undernourishment	  and	  one	  out	  of	  eight	  people	  in	  the	  world	  goes	  to	  bed	  hungry	  at	  night	  (FAO,	  IFAD	  &	  WFP	  2014).	  	  Although	  the	  total	  number	  of	  chronically	  undernourished	  people	  worldwide	  has	  fallen	  by	  20	  percent	  since	  1990–92,	  the	  progress	  has	  slowed	  significantly	  since	  the	  food	  price	  and	  economic	  crises	  in	  2007–2009	  (FAO	  2014).	  The	  hunger	  target	  of	  the	  first	  Millennium	  Development	  Goal	  (MDG)	  of	  halving	  the	  proportion	  of	  undernourished	  people	  in	  developing	  countries	  by	  2015	  is	  by	  some	  considered	  within	  reach	  	  (United	  Nations	  2013)	  and	  will	  according	  to	  others	  (Alarcon,	  Felix	  &	  Joehnk,	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit	  2013)	  clearly	  be	  missed.	  Either	  way,	  food	  insecurity	  remains	  a	  global	  tragedy	  and	  a	  threat	  to	  a	  large	  part	  of	  humanity.	  	  FAO	  Hunger	  Map	  2014.	  Prevalence	  of	  undernourishment	  in	  the	  population	  (percent)	  in	  2012-­‐2014.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  FAO	  Statistics	  Division	  (ESS),	  FAO	  Global	  Administrative	  Unit	  Layers	  (GAUL),	  ETOPO1	  (National	  Geophysical	  Data	  Center),	  FAO	  Land	  and	  Water	  Division	  (NRL)	  2014.	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  Hunger	  kills	  more	  people	  every	  year	  than	  AIDS,	  malaria	  and	  tuberculosis	  together	  (WFP	  2014),	  and	  people	  escaping	  death	  still	  suffer	  serious	  consequences	  from	  not	  gaining	  enough	  energy	  to	  live	  an	  active	  and	  dignified	  life.	  Their	  undernourishment	  makes	  it	  hard,	  or	  even	  impossible,	  to	  attend	  school,	  work	  or	  perform	  physical	  activities	  in	  their	  everyday	  lives.	  Mothers	  suffering	  from	  constant	  hunger	  often	  give	  birth	  to	  weak	  and	  underweight	  babies	  and	  face	  a	  greater	  risk	  of	  dying	  when	  giving	  birth.	  Undernourished	  children	  grow	  slower	  than	  healthy	  children,	  both	  physically	  and	  mentally,	  which	  might	  hinder	  their	  ability	  to	  study	  or	  work	  later	  in	  life.	  In	  addition,	  chronic	  hunger	  breaks	  down	  the	  immune	  system,	  making	  hungry	  people	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  diseases	  (WFP	  2014).	  	  Hunger	  is	  not	  only	  a	  problem	  at	  the	  individual	  level,	  it	  affects	  whole	  societies	  and	  states,	  and	  by	  extension	  the	  developing	  world	  at	  large,	  as	  it	  imposes	  a	  severe	  economic	  burden.	  Economists	  estimate	  that	  every	  physically	  and	  mentally	  stunted	  child	  will	  lose	  5-­‐10	  percent	  in	  lifetime	  earnings	  (United	  Nations	  2014).	  	  The	  food	  security	  situation	  in	  the	  world	  today	  is	  a	  miserable	  picture	  and	  does	  not	  put	  international	  hunger	  reduction	  efforts,	  where	  enormous	  sums	  of	  public	  funds	  have	  been	  lavished,	  in	  a	  good	  light	  (IFPRI	  2001:173).	  In	  order	  to	  meet	  this	  global	  challenge	  and	  reverse	  the	  recent	  trends	  of	  slow-­‐down,	  purposeful	  and	  coordinated	  action	  by	  national	  governments	  and	  international	  partners	  are	  of	  crucial	  importance	  (United	  Nations	  2013:4,	  10,	  Alarcon,	  Felix	  &	  Joehnk,	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit	  2013).	  The	  fact	  that	  nearly	  1	  billion	  people	  suffer	  from	  everyday	  hungry,	  despite	  that	  the	  world	  produce	  more	  than	  enough	  to	  feed	  every	  single	  person,	  has	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘the	  greatest	  scandal	  of	  our	  age’.	  There	  is	  enough	  food	  for	  everyone	  on	  this	  planet	  and	  it	  is	  argued	  by	  many	  that	  we	  do	  have	  the	  tools	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  hunger,	  with	  the	  right	  policies	  and	  efforts	  applied.	  	  	  As	  expressed	  by	  Josette	  Sheeran,	  Executive	  Director	  at	  the	  World	  Food	  Programme1:	  	  
“Ending	  world	  hunger	  is	  an	  achievable	  goal	  within	  this	  generation	  if	  the	  right	  strategies	  are	  
adopted.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  At	  the	  United	  Nations	  Summit	  on	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals	  (MDGs)	  in	  2010	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  In	  line	  with	  the	  overall	  recognition	  of	  the	  important	  role	  of	  good	  governance	  within	  development	  over	  the	  last	  decade,	  its	  importance	  for	  ensuring	  food	  security	  has	  been	  increasingly	  emphasized	  both	  within	  the	  academia	  and	  among	  policymakers.	  The	  Right	  to	  Food	  team	  at	  the	  Food	  and	  Agriculture	  Organization	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  (FAO)	  states	  that	  the	  sad	  story	  of	  global	  food	  insecurity	  is	  quickly	  told	  as:	  	  	  
”The	  problem	  of	  undernourishment	  is	  structural.	  A	  huge	  socket	  /…/	  are	  food	  insecure	  worldwide	  
–	  with	  more	  in	  times	  of	  crises.	  There	  is	  thus	  a	  growing	  belief	  of	  governance	  as	  the	  missing	  
ingredient	  in	  the	  ‘standard’	  response	  to	  food	  insecurity2”.	  	  It	  has,	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  (UN),	  been	  established	  that	  the	  global	  hunger	  problem	  is	  not	  due	  to	  a	  shortage	  of	  food,	  but	  rather	  a	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  food	  by	  the	  most	  undernourished	  and	  vulnerable	  people	  (United	  Nations	  2014,	  Maxwell	  1996,	  Haddad	  et	  al.	  1996).	  The	  UN	  has	  also	  emphasized	  that	  we	  need	  to	  be	  looking	  at	  hunger	  from	  a	  long-­‐term	  perspective	  and	  not	  just	  address	  the	  issue	  when	  a	  crisis	  takes	  place	  somewhere	  in	  the	  world	  (United	  Nations	  2014).	  It	  has	  been	  emphasized	  by	  the	  Committee	  on	  World	  Food	  Security	  (2012:7),	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  the	  structural	  and	  underlying	  causes	  of	  food	  insecurity	  and	  undernourishment	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  and	  prioritise	  efforts	  to	  promote	  food	  security	  and	  the	  right	  to	  food	  for	  all.	  Although	  realising	  the	  complexity	  of	  food	  security	  and	  hunger,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  variation	  across	  regions,	  nations,	  households	  and	  even	  individuals,	  it	  is	  valuable	  to	  examine	  what	  factors	  might	  have	  positive	  effects	  on	  hunger	  reduction.	  This	  study	  attempts	  to	  adopt	  these	  requests,	  by	  focusing	  on	  food	  security	  in	  a	  more	  chronic	  form	  and	  examining	  the	  role	  of	  governance	  as	  a	  central	  factor	  in	  food	  security.	  	  Over	  the	  last	  years,	  the	  effects	  of	  responsible	  governments	  and	  strong	  institutions	  on	  food	  security	  and	  hunger	  reduction	  has	  gained	  increased	  attention	  within	  development	  assistance.	  Quality	  of	  government	  (QoG)	  is	  listed	  as	  a	  central	  factor	  in	  ensuring	  food	  security	  in	  The	  State	  of	  Food	  Insecurity	  in	  the	  World	  2012	  (IFAD,	  WFP	  and	  FAO)	  and	  Global	  Strategic	  framework	  for	  Food	  Security	  and	  Nutrition	  (Committee	  on	  World	  Food	  Security	  2012).	  In	  2013,	  corruption	  was	  added	  as	  an	  indicator	  to	  the	  Global	  Food	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  	  The	  Right	  To	  Food	  Team,	  FAO	  2011	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Security	  Index	  (Alarcon,	  Felix	  &	  Joehnk,	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit	  2013)	  with	  the	  motivation	  that	  it	  could	  contribute	  with	  additional	  information	  about	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  governance	  system	  in	  ensuring	  availability	  of	  the	  food	  supply	  within	  countries.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  messages	  by	  IFAD,	  WFP	  and	  FAO	  (2012)	  is	  that	  governments	  need	  to	  use	  additional	  public	  resources	  to	  provide	  public	  goods	  and	  services	  to	  the	  hungry.	  	  One	  explanation	  to	  the	  failures	  of	  states	  to	  reach	  commitments	  and	  goals	  of	  food	  security	  is,	  according	  to	  their	  2012	  report,	  due	  to	  weak	  institutions	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  to	  make	  hunger	  reduction	  a	  priority	  on	  the	  political	  agenda	  (IFAD,	  WFP	  and	  FAO	  2012:22,	  Committee	  on	  World	  Food	  Security	  2012:7).	  	  Within	  research	  on	  food	  security,	  good	  governance	  has	  been	  promoted	  as	  a	  central	  determinant	  of	  hunger	  reduction	  (Sen	  1983	  and	  1999	  ,	  Besley	  and	  Burgess	  2001,	  Dreze	  1995,	  Burchi	  2011,	  Sacks	  &	  Levi	  2007).	  It	  is,	  however,	  less	  clear	  what	  kind	  of	  governance	  that	  actually	  matters,	  and	  this	  is	  a	  question	  central	  to	  research	  on	  human	  welfare	  at	  large.	  Lately,	  a	  debate	  has	  emerged	  within	  political	  science	  research,	  where	  the	  promotion	  of	  democratization	  and	  the	  expected	  positive	  effects	  from	  it	  has	  been	  increasingly	  put	  into	  doubt,	  while	  other	  aspects	  of	  governance	  has	  been	  argued	  to	  play	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  human	  welfare	  and	  food	  security	  (Rothstein	  2011,	  Diamond	  2007,	  Sacks	  &	  Levi	  2007).	  	  Following	  the	  cold	  war,	  democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  became	  dominating	  principles	  of	  a	  new	  global	  order	  and	  democracy	  promotion	  as	  a	  foreign	  policy	  goal	  has	  over	  time	  become	  increasingly	  accepted	  within	  the	  international	  community	  (Guilhot	  2005).	  Today,	  democracy	  has	  become	  an	  international	  norm	  with	  striking	  universality,	  embraced	  by	  many	  states,	  transnational	  organizations	  and	  international	  networks	  (McFaul	  2004:148).	  Within	  development	  assistance,	  efforts	  towards	  democratization	  has	  often	  been	  promoted	  and	  rewarded	  both	  by	  states	  and	  multilateral	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  (WB)	  (Brown	  2005,	  Guilhot	  2005).	  Claims	  emphasizing	  that	  democracies	  perform	  better	  than	  nondemocratic	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  producing	  human	  welfare	  and	  providing	  public	  goods	  for	  their	  citizens	  are	  now	  being	  questioned	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  democracies	  fail	  in	  these	  aspects	  (Rothstein	  2011,	  Diamond	  2007).	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In	  attempts	  to	  track	  down	  the	  causes	  behind	  these	  failures,	  scholars	  have	  lifted	  the	  issue	  of	  bad	  governance	  as	  a	  central	  factor.	  An	  increased	  realization	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  can’t	  assume	  that	  democracies	  automatically	  will	  produce	  good	  governance	  has	  led	  to	  a	  discussion	  on	  different	  aspects	  of	  good	  governance,	  where	  an	  increased	  focus	  on	  the	  
exercise	  of	  power	  among	  governments,	  Quality	  of	  Government,	  has	  been	  promoted	  by	  some	  scholars.	  They	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  good	  QoG	  that	  produces	  desirable	  social	  outcomes,	  rather	  than	  regime	  type	  or	  level	  of	  democratization	  within	  countries	  (Holmberg	  &	  Rothstein	  2010,	  Norris	  2012).	  This	  debate	  is	  present	  also	  within	  the	  food	  security	  research.	  For	  quite	  some	  time,	  the	  dominating	  theory	  within	  this	  field	  was	  that	  ‘democracy	  prevents	  famine’,	  but	  in	  line	  with	  the	  general	  discussion	  on	  what	  type	  of	  governance	  that	  actually	  matters,	  critics	  of	  democracy	  promotion	  have	  put	  forward	  counter-­‐arguments	  built	  on	  the	  greater	  importance	  of	  good	  governance,	  in	  terms	  of	  strong	  institutions,	  effective	  governments	  and	  absence	  of	  corruption	  (Plumper	  and	  Neumayer	  2009,	  Brass	  1986,	  Rubin	  2009)	  Another	  group	  of	  scholars	  have	  moved	  even	  further,	  passed	  the	  institutional	  approach,	  on	  to	  emphasizing	  the	  role	  of	  political	  will	  within	  hunger	  reduction	  (Devereux	  2000).	  While	  the	  theoretical	  arguments	  of	  the	  two	  camps	  of	  governance	  promoters	  both	  within	  human	  welfare	  in	  general	  and	  food	  security	  more	  specifically	  are	  many,	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  is	  more	  scarce,	  which	  is	  where	  this	  study	  aims	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  research	  field	  of	  governance	  and	  food	  security.	  Hence,	  one	  motivation	  for	  this	  study	  is	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  what	  aspects	  of	  governance	  that	  produce	  social	  welfare	  with	  a	  food	  security	  focus.	  In	  addition,	  good	  governance	  as	  a	  determinant	  of	  food	  security	  will	  naturally	  be	  tested	  against	  other	  explanations	  within	  existing	  research.	  The	  study	  also	  includes	  an	  attempt	  to	  move	  away	  from	  the	  emergency	  relief	  approach,	  which	  is	  heavily	  dominant	  within	  the	  food	  security	  research.	  The	  focus	  will	  be	  shifted	  from	  starvation	  and	  death	  to	  more	  chronic	  food	  insecurity	  in	  terms	  of	  undernourishment.	  	  On	  a	  policy	  level,	  this	  study	  could	  hopefully	  contribute	  to	  insights	  on	  what	  factors	  that	  might	  have	  positive	  effects	  on	  hunger	  reduction	  in	  order	  to	  get	  closer	  to	  MDG	  1	  and	  reach	  future	  hunger	  reduction	  goals.	  In	  addition,	  it	  could	  be	  valuable	  for	  the	  development	  assistance	  community	  to	  get	  further	  insights	  on	  if	  democracy	  promotion	  is	  truly	  motivated	  or	  if	  there	  is	  a	  reason	  to	  shift	  focus	  to	  other	  aspects	  of	  governance.	  If	  more	  states	  are	  to	  succeed	  in	  improving	  human	  well-­‐being,	  and	  food	  security	  in	  this	  case,	  a	  more	  precise	  understanding	  and	  knowledge	  of	  which	  institutions	  that	  provide	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desirable	  outcomes	  is	  required	  (Rothstein	  2014).	  	  Hence,	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  yet	  mainly	  theoretical	  debate	  on	  weather	  democracy	  or	  Quality	  of	  Government	  matters	  for	  human	  welfare	  with	  a	  food	  security	  focus,	  by	  decreasing	  the	  existing	  empirical	  gap.	  	  The	  objective	  is	  to	  do	  so	  by	  empirically	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  democracy	  and	  Quality	  of	  Government	  on	  access	  to	  food.	  
	  
1.1	  Disposition	  The	  study	  starts	  of	  by	  a	  theoretical	  part	  containing	  previous	  research	  on	  the	  role	  of	  democracy	  and	  Quality	  of	  Government	  in	  human	  welfare	  promotion	  and	  provision	  of	  public	  goods.	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  existing	  research	  on	  the	  same	  issue	  but	  within	  the	  food	  security	  literature.	  	  Based	  on	  existing	  theories	  and	  research,	  the	  aim	  and	  objective	  of	  the	  study	  is	  presented	  and	  then	  peeled	  off	  into	  research	  questions	  and	  more	  specific	  hypothesis,	  which	  are	  to	  guide	  the	  further	  development	  of	  the	  study.	  	  Next	  is	  a	  presentation	  of	  concepts	  central	  to	  the	  study,	  the	  methodological	  approach	  and	  the	  operationalization	  of	  these	  concepts.	  	  Furthermore,	  a	  statistical	  analysis	  is	  carried	  out	  followed	  by	  a	  presentation	  of	  the	  results	  and	  an	  analysis	  of	  these.	  Last	  but	  not	  least	  follows	  a	  concluding	  remark,	  aiming	  to	  wrap	  the	  study	  up.	  	  
2.	  Previous	  research	  and	  theory	  	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  previous	  research	  within	  the	  fields	  of	  democracy	  and	  Quality	  of	  
Government	  and	  human	  welfare	  is	  presented.	  One	  field	  of	  literature	  argue	  that	  
democracy	  promotes	  human	  welfare	  and	  provision	  of	  public	  goods.	  This	  approach	  has	  
been	  criticized	  by	  scholars	  questioning	  the	  faith	  to	  democracy,	  and	  instead	  promoting	  the	  
role	  of	  Quality	  of	  Government.	  A	  similar	  governance	  debate	  can	  be	  found	  within	  the	  food	  
security	  literature	  presented	  next.	  Based	  on	  this,	  a	  theoretical	  argument	  is	  put	  forward,	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2.1	  Democracy	  versus	  Quality	  of	  Government	  and	  human	  welfare	  	  	  The	  rise	  of	  democracy	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  substantial	  field	  of	  literature,	  where	  the	  main	  purpose	  so	  far	  has	  been	  to	  examine	  and	  explain	  the	  causes	  and	  barriers	  of	  the	  development	  of	  representative	  democracy	  in	  different	  states.	  	  One	  question,	  which	  has	  gained	  surprisingly	  limited	  attention,	  is	  how	  democracies	  actually	  perform.	  Questions	  such	  as	  if	  democracies	  provide	  human	  welfare,	  and	  how	  they	  influence	  the	  lives	  of	  their	  citizens	  have	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  been	  left	  unanswered	  (Rothstein	  2014).	  An	  existing	  perception	  within	  the	  democratization	  literature	  is	  that	  democracies	  perform	  better	  than	  nondemocratic	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  providing	  public	  goods	  and	  producing	  human	  welfare	  for	  their	  citizens	  (Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  2012,	  Vollmer	  and	  Ziegler	  2009,	  Harding	  and	  Wantchekon	  2010:14).	  A	  number	  of	  mechanisms	  are	  offered	  to	  explain	  why	  that	  is,	  and	  these	  can	  more	  or	  less	  be	  divided	  into	  three	  categories:	  	  representation,	  accountability	  and	  selection	  (Harding	  and	  Wantchekon	  2010:14).	  According	  to	  the	  first	  explanation	  offered,	  we	  can	  expect	  greater	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  in	  a	  democracy	  than	  in	  an	  autocracy,	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  people	  in	  democracies	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  higher	  preferences	  for	  public	  services	  and	  redistribution	  of	  resources	  than	  populations	  in	  autocracies.	  Therefore,	  democracies	  are	  more	  responsive	  to	  the	  higher	  redistributive	  concerns	  of	  the	  decisive	  median	  voter,	  while	  in	  autocracies,	  these	  incentives	  to	  redistribute	  are	  missing	  (Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  2001,	  Vollmer	  and	  Ziegler	  2009).	  The	  accountability	  promoters	  explain	  the	  relationship	  to	  exist	  based	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  citizens	  to	  hold	  politicians	  accountable	  in	  terms	  of	  elections	  and	  therefore	  they	  tend	  to	  feel	  obligated	  to	  provide	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  the	  population	  with	  public	  goods	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  The	  third	  category	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  competitive	  elections	  and	  participation	  that	  matters	  the	  most.	  Lower	  barriers	  for	  politicians	  to	  exit	  and	  for	  citizen	  participation	  makes	  the	  political	  market	  more	  contestable	  and	  increases	  the	  public	  goods	  provision	  by	  the	  government,	  with	  rent	  maximizing	  ambitions	  (Baum	  and	  Lake	  2003).	  Although	  some	  scholars	  claim	  to	  have	  found	  support	  for	  the	  argument	  that	  democracy	  promotes	  human	  welfare	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  in	  terms	  of	  infrastructure,	  water,	  public	  sanitation,	  public	  schooling,	  life	  expectancy	  and	  infant	  mortality	  (Deacon	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and	  Saha	  2005,	  Antonis	  et	  al.	  2009,	  Biser	  and	  Edwards	  2012),	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  scarce,	  weak,	  based	  on	  biased	  samples	  and	  open	  to	  scientific	  debate	  (Ross	  2006,	  Rothstein	  2014).	  Over	  the	  years,	  the	  literature	  promoting	  democracy	  in	  this	  aspect	  has	  been	  increasingly	  questioned	  (Holmberg	  &	  Rothstein	  2010,	  Rothstein	  2011	  &	  2014).	  If	  these	  pro-­‐democracy	  arguments	  are	  true,	  then	  how	  come	  so	  many	  of	  the	  world’s	  democracies	  are	  unable	  to	  produce	  human	  welfare	  and	  provide	  public	  goods	  for	  their	  populations?	  	  The	  ‘surprisingly	  uneven’	  track	  record	  of	  the	  performances	  of	  democracies	  is	  for	  the	  most	  part	  reflected	  in	  large	  n-­‐studies.	  Using	  a	  set	  of	  thirty	  standard	  measures	  of	  national	  levels	  of	  human	  well-­‐being	  and	  some	  variables	  known	  to	  be	  related	  to	  human-­‐well	  being,	  Holmberg	  and	  Rothstein	  (2010)	  find	  only	  weak,	  non-­‐existing,	  or	  sometimes	  even	  negative,	  correlations	  between	  the	  level	  of	  democracy	  and	  standard	  measures	  of	  human	  well-­‐being.	  The	  result	  implies	  that	  representative	  democracy	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  safe	  cure	  against	  severe	  poverty,	  economic	  inequality,	  illiteracy,	  general	  life-­‐expectancy,	  high	  maternal	  mortality,	  lack	  of	  access	  to	  safe	  water	  or	  sanitation.	  Hence,	  democracy	  is	  only	  weakly	  correlated,	  or	  even	  unrelated,	  to	  measures	  of	  human	  well	  being.	  These	  results	  are	  in	  addition	  confirmed	  by	  studies	  carried	  out	  by	  Norris	  (2012).	  As	  expressed	  by	  Besley	  and	  Kudamatsu	  (2006:313):	  	  
“In	  spite	  of	  the	  inexorable	  march	  of	  democracy	  around	  the	  globe,	  just	  how	  democratic	  institutions	  
affect	  human	  well-­being	  is	  up	  to	  debate”.	  In	  the	  literature	  investigating	  what	  is	  causing	  dysfunctional	  democracies,	  lack	  of	  	  ‘good	  governance’	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  a	  main	  factor	  (Diamond	  2007,	  Rothstein	  2011	  &	  2014).	  According	  to	  Diamond,	  democracy	  today	  is	  haunted	  by	  a	  ghost,	  and	  that	  is	  bad	  governance.	  He	  refers	  to	  bad	  governance	  as	  the	  type	  of	  governance	  plagued	  by	  corruption,	  favouritism,	  patronage	  and	  abuse	  of	  power,	  favouring	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  ruling	  elite.	  This	  type	  of	  governance	  does	  not	  improve	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  many,	  as	  the	  power	  holders	  are	  stealing,	  wasting	  or	  distributing	  available	  resources	  in	  an	  unequal	  manner	  (Diamond	  2007:119).	  	  This	  criticism	  has	  raised	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  need	  to	  discuss	  the	  concept	  of	  good	  governance	  and	  the	  different	  dimensions	  captured	  by	  it.	  Scholars	  have	  increasingly	  emphasized	  that	  democracy	  cannot	  be	  a	  sufficient	  criterion	  of	  good	  governance	  and	  that	  a	  democratic	  country	  does	  not	  automatically	  produce	  good	  quality	  of	  government	  (Rothstein	  2011	  &	  2014).	  	  It	  has	  actually	  been	  argued	  that	  democracy	  at	  times	  generate	  low	  QoG.	  An	  example	  of	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this,	  reflecting	  the	  argument	  made	  by	  Diamond,	  is	  when	  the	  majority	  of	  voters	  in	  a	  country	  support	  corrupt	  politicians	  and	  discrimination	  against	  minority	  groups	  (Rothstein	  2014).	  Hence,	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  is	  not	  always	  conducted	  in	  a	  fair	  and	  impartial	  manner	  in	  democracies.	  The	  reasons	  why	  democracy	  does	  not	  sufficiently	  cut	  it	  as	  a	  definition	  of	  QoG	  are	  not	  just	  theoretical,	  but	  also	  empirical,	  as	  no	  straightforward	  relationship	  between	  democracy	  and	  QoG	  has	  been	  established	  (Rothstein	  2011:25).	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  a	  number	  of	  large-­‐n	  studies	  have	  landed	  in	  a	  ‘contradictory’	  relationship	  between	  democracy	  and	  QoG,	  where	  QoG	  has	  decreased	  as	  democracy	  has	  increased	  (Weyland	  1998,	  Sung	  2004).	  Hence,	  the	  relationship	  between	  democracy	  and	  QoG	  seem	  not	  to	  be	  straight,	  but	  rather	  curvilinear	  (Bäck	  &	  Hadenius	  2008;	  Sung	  2004).	  In	  fact,	  corruption,	  appears	  to	  be	  worst	  in	  newly	  democratized	  countries,	  while	  in	  some	  authoritarian	  states,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  have	  managed	  to	  provide	  a	  somewhat	  impartial	  bureaucracy	  and	  keeping	  corruption	  levels	  low	  (McMillian	  and	  Zoido	  2004,	  Root	  1996).	  	  Over	  the	  years,	  an	  extensive	  literature	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  QoG	  has	  emerged,	  examining	  its	  effects	  on	  a	  great	  variation	  of	  outcomes.	  Part	  of	  the	  literature	  has	  paid	  interest	  to	  the	  link	  between	  QoG	  and	  social	  well	  being,	  including	  indicators	  such	  as	  poverty,	  economic	  inequality,	  solid	  social	  insurance	  systems	  and	  food	  security	  of	  households	  (Rothstein	  2011:47-­‐49,	  Sacks	  &	  Levi	  2007).	  Various	  measures	  of	  QoG	  and	  state	  capacity	  have	  proven	  to	  have	  strong	  effects	  on	  almost	  all	  standard	  measures	  of	  human	  well	  being	  	  (Norris	  2012,	  Holmberg	  and	  Rothstein	  2010).	  QoG	  indicators	  such	  as	  rule	  of	  law,	  control	  of	  corruption	  and	  government	  effectiveness	  have	  in	  a	  number	  of	  initial	  correlation	  and	  regression	  analysis	  proven	  to	  have	  positive	  effects	  on	  social	  outcomes,	  such	  as	  population	  health	  and	  social	  policy	  outcomes	  (Rothstein	  2011:43-­‐44,	  47).	  In	  addition,	  research	  show	  that	  corruption	  affects	  economic	  and	  governance	  factors,	  such	  as	  lower	  quality	  of	  infrastructure	  and	  poor	  targeting	  of	  social	  programs	  (Chetwynd,	  Chetwynd	  and	  Spector	  2003).	  	  This	  study	  aims	  at	  providing	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  role	  of	  democracy	  versus	  the	  role	  of	  QoG	  on	  human	  welfare	  with	  empirical	  evidence,	  by	  investigating	  the	  outcome	  in	  terms	  of	  food	  security,	  which	  is	  a	  rather	  unexplored	  aspect	  of	  human	  welfare	  within	  this	  debate.	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2.2	  Democracy	  versus	  Quality	  of	  Government	  and	  food	  security	  	  Within	  the	  governance	  and	  food	  security	  literature	  three	  theoretical	  perspectives	  are	  dominant;	  the	  democracy	  argument,	  the	  institutional	  approach	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  political	  will.	  	  Within	  the	  theory,	  and	  in	  particular	  literature	  focusing	  on	  famine	  prevention,	  democracy	  has	  been	  central	  when	  investigating	  the	  role	  of	  governance	  on	  different	  food	  insecurity	  outcomes.	  A	  dominating	  theory	  within	  this	  field	  has	  been	  the	  one	  provided	  by	  Amartya	  Sen	  (1983,	  1999)	  whose	  well-­‐known	  argument	  ‘democracy	  prevents	  famine’	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  a	  rather	  comprehensive	  academic	  discussion	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  democracy	  on	  famines,	  which	  has	  come	  to	  dominate	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  food	  security	  up	  until	  this	  day	  (Bardhan	  1999,	  Banik	  2007,	  Osmani	  2007).	  Sen	  argues	  that	  sound	  democracies	  are	  characterized	  by	  specific	  features	  preventing	  famines	  from	  occurring.	  He	  motivates	  his	  argument	  by	  emphasizing	  the	  role	  of	  competition	  within	  politics,	  elections	  and	  a	  free	  media	  (Sen	  1983,	  1999).	  To	  prove	  his	  point	  he	  points	  to	  famines	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  authoritarian	  states	  of	  North	  Korea	  and	  Sudan.	  Also,	  a	  great	  famine	  took	  place	  in	  the	  autocratic	  China	  but	  not	  in	  the	  democratic	  India	  in	  the	  end	  of	  the	  50’s	  and	  beginning	  of	  the	  60’s,	  although	  China	  was	  much	  stronger	  than	  India	  economically.	  China’s	  failure	  to	  prevent	  the	  famine,	  was	  according	  to	  Sen,	  due	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  opposition	  parties	  in	  parliament,	  multiparty	  elections	  and	  a	  free	  press,	  which	  allowed	  for	  ineffective	  governmental	  policies	  to	  remain	  in	  place	  despite	  the	  obvious	  failures	  reflected	  in	  the	  millions	  of	  life	  lost.	  According	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  Sen,	  famines	  are	  not	  hard	  to	  prevent	  if	  there	  is	  a	  serious	  effort	  by	  a	  democratic	  government,	  faced	  by,	  elections,	  critical	  opposition	  parties	  and	  independent	  newspapers	  (Sen	  1983,	  1999).	  As	  evident,	  the	  mechanisms	  provided	  by	  the	  ‘democracy	  prevents	  famine’	  argument	  fits	  well	  into	  the	  three	  categories	  of	  representation,	  accountability	  and	  selection	  offered	  by	  the	  literature	  on	  democracy	  and	  public	  goods	  provision.	  	  Sen’s	  argument	  has	  been	  put	  to	  the	  test	  by	  a	  large	  field	  of	  research	  within	  food	  security.	  Some	  scholars	  argue	  that	  both	  cross-­‐country	  and	  single	  country	  evidence	  before	  and	  after	  a	  change	  in	  the	  political	  system,	  have	  provided	  support	  for	  the	  argument	  (Sen	  1999,	  Besley	  and	  Burgess	  2001,	  Dreze	  1995).	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Others	  whom	  have	  investigated	  the	  argument	  empirically	  have	  found	  that	  democracy	  as	  a	  key	  determinant	  in	  preventing	  famines	  needs	  to	  be	  questioned	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  definitions,	  estimates	  and	  empirical	  evidence,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  that	  might	  underpin	  the	  relationship	  (Burchi	  2011,	  Plumper	  and	  Neumayer	  2009,	  Brass	  1986,	  Rubin	  2009).	  	  This	  more	  critical	  literature	  has	  helped	  to	  widen	  the	  debate	  by	  approaching	  democracy	  in	  a	  more	  reserved	  manner	  and	  by	  providing	  a	  theoretical	  base	  for	  identifying	  possible	  explanations	  to	  why	  fairly	  democratic	  countries	  have	  not	  always	  been	  able	  to	  prevent	  famines	  (Burchi	  2011).	  	  Some	  opponents	  have	  taken	  the	  criticism	  even	  further	  by	  claiming	  that	  democratic	  states	  might	  actually	  be	  less	  motivated	  to	  respond	  to	  famine	  crises	  than	  authoritarian	  states,	  due	  to	  the	  possibility	  to	  pass	  on	  the	  responsibility	  to	  other	  players	  within	  the	  political	  system	  (Brass	  1986,	  Rubin	  2009	  and	  Plumper	  and	  Neumayer	  2009).	  	  This	  field	  of	  critics	  have	  provided	  important	  insights	  to	  the	  food	  security	  literature	  motivating	  a	  need	  to	  look	  passed	  democracy	  and	  rather	  focus	  on	  institutional	  arrangements	  within	  regimes,	  which	  is	  well	  in	  line	  with	  the	  general	  democracy	  versus	  QoG	  debate,	  where	  scholars	  have	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  to	  move	  away	  from	  a	  democracy	  focus	  when	  investigating	  what	  produced	  desirable	  social	  outcomes	  (Rothstein	  2011).	  	  Contributing	  to	  a	  step	  towards	  institutional	  arrangements,	  Burchi	  does	  not	  just	  test	  the	  validity	  of	  Sen’s	  argument,	  but	  investigates	  if	  governance	  might	  play	  a	  larger	  role	  than	  democracy	  in	  famine	  prevention.	  He	  examines	  if	  the	  possible	  effect	  of	  institutions	  actually	  might	  replace	  the	  effect	  of	  democracy,	  or	  if	  the	  two	  are	  interrelated	  (Burchi	  2011:18).	  By	  including	  the	  quality	  of	  institutions	  and	  governance	  in	  the	  analysis,	  Burchi	  argues	  that	  both	  formal	  and	  informal	  institutions	  could	  be	  important	  factors	  in	  tackling	  famines	  (Burchi	  2011:17).	  	  The	  theory	  is	  put	  to	  the	  test	  through	  an	  econometric	  analysis	  covering	  a	  large	  number	  of	  emerging	  and	  developing	  countries,	  providing	  empirical	  support	  for	  Sen’s	  claim	  that	  democracy	  does	  prevent	  famine,	  but	  also	  calling	  for	  deeper	  analysis	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  institutions.	  As	  democracy	  turned	  out	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  negative	  effect	  on	  famine	  mortality,	  so	  did	  ‘government	  effectiveness’	  and	  ‘control	  of	  corruption’	  (Burchi	  2011:28).	  The	  conclusion	  states	  that	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  government	  and	  the	  bureaucracy	  in	  making	  decisions	  and	  implementing	  those,	  the	  policy	  climate	  and	  a	  range	  of	  other	  governance	  features	  are	  central	  to	  famine	  prevention.	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In	  addition,	  two	  samples	  are	  created,	  one	  democratic	  and	  one	  autocratic	  and	  the	  results	  indicated	  that	  an	  enlightened	  authoritarian	  government	  with	  a	  certain	  degree,	  but	  not	  democratic,	  political	  institutions	  can	  prevent	  famines	  (Burchi	  2011:28).	  	  This	  provides	  support	  for	  the	  critics	  of	  the	  democracy	  prevents	  famine	  argument,	  who	  have	  claimed	  that	  autocracies	  in	  some	  cases	  prevent	  famine	  to	  a	  larger	  extent	  than	  democracies.	  	  Similar	  findings	  are	  presented	  by	  Sacks	  and	  Levi,	  who	  investigates	  to	  what	  extent	  governments	  are	  effective	  or	  not	  by	  looking	  at	  social	  welfare	  in	  terms	  of	  household	  food	  security.	  They	  argue	  that	  an	  effective	  government	  should	  be	  able	  to	  deliver	  necessary	  goods	  to	  their	  citizens	  for	  them	  to	  enjoy	  social	  welfare	  (Sacks	  and	  Levi	  2010:1).	  	  The	  authors	  emphasise	  the	  role	  of	  a	  reliable	  bureaucracy,	  competent	  law	  enforcement	  and	  infrastructure	  development	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  adequate	  provision	  of	  food.	  The	  arguments	  underpinning	  the	  study	  of	  Sacks	  and	  Levi	  is	  that	  poor	  roads	  lead	  to	  slow	  and	  costly	  transportation,	  which	  can	  cause	  serious	  inconvenience	  for	  government	  and	  aid	  agencies	  aiming	  to	  deliver	  food	  aid	  during	  crises.	  In	  addition,	  weak	  bureaucracies	  can	  hinder	  the	  ability	  of	  these	  agencies	  to	  properly	  identify	  areas	  and	  people	  in	  need	  of	  aid.	  A	  poor	  bureaucracy	  can	  also	  keep	  farmers	  from	  accessing	  necessary	  loans	  in	  order	  to	  buy	  farming	  equipment,	  jeopardizing	  their	  food	  security.	  	  Although,	  some	  of	  the	  variation	  in	  food	  security	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  result	  of	  socio-­‐demographic	  variables,	  such	  as	  household	  wealth,	  physical	  health,	  age	  and	  residence,	  the	  findings	  suggest	  that	  a	  government	  can	  either	  help	  or	  hinder	  citizens	  from	  attaining	  food	  security	  by	  providing	  or	  not	  providing	  necessary	  public	  goods.	  According	  to	  their	  results,	  institutions	  in	  terms	  of	  rule	  of	  law,	  bureaucratic	  enforcement	  and	  infrastructure	  development	  does	  affect	  food	  security	  (Sacks	  and	  Levi	  2010:16).	  The	  statement	  that	  governments	  can	  either	  help	  or	  hinder	  citizens	  from	  attaining	  food	  security,	  made	  by	  Sacks	  and	  Levi,	  is	  bordering	  on	  a	  field	  of	  literature,	  which	  moves	  past	  the	  institutional	  approach	  and	  view	  famines	  as	  a	  political	  phenomena,	  emphasising	  the	  role	  of	  political	  will	  in	  food	  security	  (De	  Waal	  1990,	  Devereux	  2000).	  	  	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  main	  scholars	  within	  this	  field,	  Devereux,	  is	  of	  the	  firm	  understanding	  that	  if	  we	  are	  to	  completely	  eradicate	  famine	  and	  undernourishment	  during	  the	  21st	  century,	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it	  does	  not	  only	  require	  technical	  capacity	  in	  terms	  of	  food	  production	  and	  distribution	  –	  substantially	  what	  is	  required	  is	  more	  political	  will	  at	  national	  and	  international	  levels	  than	  what	  has	  been	  evident	  to	  date	  (Devereux	  2000:1).	  Devereux	  is	  critical	  to	  addressing	  famines	  as	  purely	  institutional,	  organisational	  and	  policy	  failures.	  While	  agreeing	  that	  ‘famine-­‐prone	  countries’	  in	  general	  have	  poorly	  performing	  economies	  and	  weak	  institutions,	  and	  without	  denying	  that	  poverty	  is	  a	  central	  precondition	  for	  undernutrition	  and	  famine,	  the	  explanation	  is	  not	  sufficient.	  The	  political	  aspect	  of	  famines	  is	  excluded	  from	  these	  analyses,	  which,	  according	  to	  Devereux,	  impersonalises	  and	  depoliticises	  the	  phenomenon	  (Devereux	  2000:24).	  He	  states	  that	  famines	  are	  always	  political	  and	  that	  they	  take	  place	  because	  they	  are	  not	  prevented,	  but	  allowed	  to	  happen	  (Devereux	  2000:27).	  	  Food	  crises	  do	  not	  happen	  over	  night;	  in	  most	  cases	  they	  have	  a	  gestation	  period	  of	  months	  and	  years,	  which	  motivates	  analysis	  on	  failures	  of	  response	  and	  public	  action.	  Although	  lack	  of	  government	  response	  can	  be	  due	  to	  a	  number	  of	  factors,	  such	  as	  inadequate	  information,	  weak	  and	  inefficient	  bureaucracy,	  lack	  of	  capacity	  to	  respond	  and	  act	  quick	  and	  effectively,	  but	  according	  to	  this	  camp	  of	  scholars	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  to	  act	  needs	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  equation	  (Devereux	  2000:27).	  	  As	  evident,	  solid	  research	  and	  interesting	  results	  within	  this	  field	  of	  literature	  has	  been	  provided.	  However,	  Burchi’s	  food	  security	  focus	  is	  on	  famines,	  in	  line	  with	  much	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  food	  security.	  This	  study	  fills	  both	  a	  theoretical	  and	  empirical	  gap	  by	  focusing	  on	  undernourishment	  as	  a	  more	  chronic	  form	  of	  food	  insecurity,	  which	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  is	  absent	  in	  previous	  research.	  Sacks	  and	  Levi	  is	  an	  exception	  of	  this,	  as	  their	  outcome	  variable	  is	  access	  to	  food.	  Their	  study,	  however,	  is	  limited	  to	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  and	  does	  only	  include	  16	  countries.	  	  This	  study,	  thereby,	  hope	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  research	  field	  with	  a	  global	  approach	  to	  food	  insecurity	  by	  including	  all	  developing	  countries	  in	  the	  analysis.	  To	  my	  knowledge,	  no	  large-­‐n	  study	  with	  this	  particular	  focus	  has	  been	  carried	  out	  until	  this	  day.	  Not	  everyone	  would	  agree	  that	  food	  insecurity	  fore	  a	  most	  is	  a	  governance	  issue.	  More	  traditional	  competing	  explanations	  in	  previous	  literature,	  among	  others,	  include	  population,	  trade,	  poverty,	  infrastructure	  and	  political	  stability.	  The	  arguments	  behind	  these	  possible	  determinants	  of	  food	  security	  will	  briefly	  be	  elaborated	  in	  the	  empirical	  section	  of	  this	  study.	  Therefore,	  the	  role	  of	  governance	  as	  a	  determinant	  of	  food	  security	  will	  also	  be	  examined	  against	  these	  other	  explanations	  from	  previous	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literature.	  	  
2.3	  The	  output	  of	  governance	  When	  investigating	  how	  to	  improve	  human	  well	  being,	  the	  political	  science	  research	  community	  have	  mostly	  paid	  attention	  to	  one	  part	  of	  the	  political	  system	  –	  namely	  access	  to	  power,	  while	  the	  other	  part	  of	  the	  system	  –	  exercise	  of	  power,	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  has	  been	  overlooked	  (Rothstein	  2013:12:5-­‐6).	  	  According	  to	  Rothstein,	  we	  need	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  input	  and	  the	  output	  side	  of	  governance.	  The	  input	  side,	  relating	  to	  access	  to	  public	  authority,	  include	  the	  right	  to	  run	  for	  office,	  election	  rules,	  the	  formation	  of	  cabinets	  and	  financing	  of	  parties.	  The	  output	  side,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  refers	  to	  the	  way	  political	  authority	  is	  conducted	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  how	  the	  state	  is	  capable	  of	  governing	  the	  society.	  He	  argues	  that	  if	  political	  scientists	  shift	  focus	  from	  representative	  democracy	  to	  measures	  of	  Quality	  of	  Government	  or	  state	  capacity	  the	  picture	  of	  what	  politics	  can	  do	  for	  human	  well-­‐being	  will	  change	  dramatically	  (Rothstein	  2013:12:3-­‐4).	  Providing	  valuable	  input	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  democracy,	  QoG	  and	  public	  goods	  provision	  is	  Harding	  and	  Wanchekon	  (2010),	  when	  highlighting	  the	  limitations	  of	  democracy	  in	  human	  welfare	  promotion.	  They	  argue	  that	  democratic	  institutions	  can	  pave	  the	  way	  for	  human	  welfare	  and	  public	  goods	  provision,	  but	  the	  outcome	  is	  not	  guaranteed.	  These	  arguments	  are	  in	  line	  with	  the	  ones	  of	  Rothstein	  and	  do	  further	  motivate	  a	  shift	  of	  focus	  from	  the	  input	  to	  the	  output	  side	  of	  governance.	  Joining	  in	  on	  the	  Diamond	  argument	  that	  democracy	  might	  be	  undermined	  by	  the	  ghosts	  of	  bad	  governance,	  Harding	  and	  Wanchekon	  takes	  the	  analysis	  one	  step	  further	  by	  providing	  possible	  answers	  to	  why	  that	  is,	  providing	  a	  theory	  on	  mechanisms	  central	  to	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  input	  versus	  the	  output	  side	  of	  governance.	  They	  put	  forward	  central	  mechanisms	  by	  which	  democracy	  is	  expected	  to	  affect	  human	  welfare	  and	  argue	  that	  these	  mechanisms	  are	  necessary	  for	  democracy	  to	  actually	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  human	  welfare	  because	  if	  they	  are	  not	  in	  place,	  the	  effect	  will	  most	  likely	  vanish.	  This	  argument	  underpins	  both	  the	  motivation	  to	  test	  the	  relationship	  between	  democracy	  and	  human	  welfare	  as	  well	  as	  the	  development	  of	  the	  theoretical	  argument	  of	  this	  study.	  	  According	  to	  their	  work,	  the	  opportunities	  for	  human	  welfare	  development	  provided	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by	  democracy	  might	  very	  well	  be	  undermined	  by	  clientism	  and	  corruption	  if	  accountability	  structures	  are	  missing.	  Hence,	  democratic	  institutions	  generate	  incentives	  for	  power	  holders	  to	  provide	  public	  goods,	  but	  if	  the	  accountability	  mechanisms	  are	  not	  utilized	  by	  the	  people,	  politicians	  can	  instead	  react	  to	  electoral	  incentives	  by	  engaging	  in	  clientism	  and	  providing	  private	  rather	  than	  public	  goods	  (Harding	  and	  Wanchekon	  2010).	  The	  ability	  for	  citizens	  to	  demand	  accountability	  is,	  according	  to	  the	  writers	  and	  other	  scholars	  promoting	  this	  argument,	  dependent	  on	  factors	  such	  as	  information,	  and	  
participation.	  Citizens	  need	  information	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  officials	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  effectively	  hold	  political	  elites	  accountable.	  In	  addition,	  information	  facilitates	  participation,	  which	  has	  also	  proven	  to	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  public	  goods	  provision	  and	  human	  development	  (Harding	  and	  Wanchekon	  2010).	  	  These	  arguments	  are	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  this	  study	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  undernourished	  people	  in	  the	  world	  are	  populations	  in	  rural	  areas,	  and	  in	  particular	  women.	  Access	  to	  information	  in	  rural	  areas	  is	  in	  general	  lower	  than	  in	  urban	  areas	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  political	  life	  is	  lower	  when	  living	  in	  rural	  areas,	  far	  from	  the	  cities	  where	  much	  of	  the	  political	  discourse	  takes	  place.	  Both	  information	  and	  participation	  is	  harder	  for	  women	  to	  access,	  due	  to	  power	  structures	  in	  the	  society	  and	  everyday	  discrimination	  based	  on	  gender.	  In	  addition,	  this	  study	  argues	  that	  a	  central	  factor	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  included	  in	  this	  argumentation	  is	  the	  issue	  of	  capacity.	  In	  order	  to	  hold	  politicians	  and	  officials	  accountable,	  the	  citizens	  need	  the	  capacity	  to	  do	  so.	  Even	  if	  there	  is	  information	  available,	  it	  is	  useless	  if	  the	  person	  cannot	  read.	  Even	  if	  there	  are	  societal	  and	  political	  meetings	  open	  to	  the	  public,	  they	  are	  useless	  if	  a	  person	  feels	  unable	  to	  fully	  participate	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  education	  and	  knowledge.	  	  Capacity	  is	  a	  factor	  of	  particular	  importance	  to	  take	  into	  account	  when	  discussing	  issues	  such	  as	  undernourishment.	  Undernourishment	  makes	  people	  weak	  and	  sick,	  unable	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  most	  basic	  tasks	  in	  their	  everyday	  life.	  	  If	  you	  are	  to	  weak	  to	  work	  or	  to	  attend	  school,	  how	  will	  you	  collect	  the	  strength	  to	  hold	  your	  politicians	  accountable?	  Information,	  participation	  and	  capacity	  are	  not	  factors	  that	  are	  in	  any	  way	  included	  in	  this	  analysis,	  but	  the	  arguments	  of	  their	  importance	  within	  democracies	  motivates	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  output	  side	  of	  governance	  and	  are	  central	  to	  the	  theoretical	  argument	  of	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this	  thesis,	  claiming	  that	  there	  indeed	  are	  reasons	  to	  question	  the	  role	  of	  democracy	  in	  food	  security	  and	  instead	  turn	  the	  focus	  to	  the	  role	  of	  Quality	  of	  Government.	  Hence,	  an	  ambition	  with	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  whether	  democracy	  or	  QoG	  promotes	  food	  security	  focus,	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  output	  side	  of	  governance.	  	  In	  addition,	  by	  the	  choice	  of	  QoG	  variable,	  there	  is	  an	  effort	  to	  get	  closer	  to	  the	  theory	  on	  the	  role	  of	  political	  will	  in	  food	  security.	  This	  study	  is	  not	  including	  political	  will	  in	  the	  analysis	  per	  se	  and	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  argue	  that	  Corruption	  Perception	  Index	  (CPI)	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  political	  will.	  However,	  by	  choosing	  to	  investigate	  the	  output	  side	  of	  governance	  by	  measuring	  the	  level	  of	  corruption,	  it	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  get	  closer	  to,	  and	  contribute	  to	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  role	  of	  responsiveness	  to	  food	  insecurity	  among	  governments,	  politicians	  and	  officials.	  So,	  if	  governmental	  power	  is	  exercised	  in	  a	  corrupt	  manner,	  this	  could	  give	  us	  an	  indication	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  will	  to	  improve	  access	  to	  food	  for	  a	  population,	  or	  certain	  parts	  of	  a	  population.	  As	  accurately	  put	  by	  Sacks	  and	  Levi,	  governments	  can	  either	  help	  or	  hinder	  citizens	  from	  attaining	  food	  security	  by	  providing	  or	  not	  providing	  necessary	  public	  goods	  (Sacks	  &	  Levi	  2007).	  
2.	  4	  Research	  questions	  	  
Does	  Quality	  of	  Government	  affect	  access	  to	  food?	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3.	  Data	  and	  methods	  	  
In	  this	  chapter	  the	  methodological	  approach	  is	  laid	  out,	  accompanied	  by	  the	  elaboration,	  
definition	  and	  operationalization	  of	  central	  concepts	  to	  the	  study.	  	  
	  
3.1	  Central	  concepts	  	  
Food	  security	  and	  hunger	  As	  evident,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  food	  security	  is	  centred	  on	  famines,	  an	  extreme	  outcome	  of	  food	  insecurity	  often	  associated	  with	  emergencies,	  starvation	  and	  death	  (Devereux	  2000).	  	  There	  is	  now	  a	  call	  for	  research	  on	  food	  security	  and	  famine	  to	  move	  away	  from	  the	  ‘emergency	  relief	  approach’	  in	  order	  to	  detect	  the	  underlying	  conditions,	  making	  shortages	  of	  food	  endemic	  (United	  Nations	  2014).	  The	  focus	  needs	  to	  shift	  from	  acute	  starvation	  and	  dramatic	  increase	  of	  mortality	  to	  sustained	  deprivation	  of	  nourishment	  on	  a	  constant	  level	  (Baro	  and	  Deubel	  2006:521).	  This	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  more	  than	  805	  million	  people	  around	  our	  globe	  are	  food	  insecure	  today	  and	  only	  a	  rather	  small	  part	  of	  these	  die	  as	  a	  result	  of	  famines	  (FAO,	  IFAD	  &	  WFP	  2014).	  As	  a	  matter	  a	  fact,	  most	  food	  insecurity	  in	  the	  world	  is	  chronic,	  as	  only	  8	  percent	  of	  deaths	  cased	  by	  hunger	  in	  2004	  were	  a	  consequence	  of	  humanitarian	  emergencies,	  while	  92	  percent	  were	  regrettable	  outcomes	  of	  chronic	  hunger	  and	  malnutrition	  (Barrett	  2010:827).	  	  Hence,	  this	  thesis	  intends	  to	  take	  on	  a	  more	  chronic	  approach	  to	  food	  security,	  caused	  by	  structural	  factors,	  and	  in	  this	  case	  QoG.	  This	  might	  be	  further	  motivated	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  role	  of	  regime	  types	  versus	  QoG	  as	  there	  is	  quite	  a	  large	  step	  between	  authoritarian	  regimes	  letting	  their	  populations	  die	  and	  democratic	  regimes	  lacking	  QoG	  to	  decrease	  the	  undernourishment	  among	  its	  population,	  and	  those	  variances	  in	  between	  might	  be	  increasingly	  captured	  by	  a	  less	  emergency	  embossed	  approach.	  	  The	  terminology	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  different	  dimensions	  of	  food	  security	  and	  hunger	  can	  be	  confusing.	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The	  most	  generally	  recognized	  definition	  of	  food	  security	  was	  agreed	  upon	  at	  the	  1996	  World	  Food	  Summit,	  where	  it	  was	  established	  that:	  	  
“Food	  security	  exists	  when	  all	  people,	  at	  all	  times,	  have	  physical,	  social	  and	  economic	  
access	  to	  sufficient,	  safe	  and	  nutritious	  food	  that	  meets	  their	  dietary	  needs	  and	  food	  
preferences	  for	  an	  active	  and	  healthy	  life”	  (Committee	  of	  World	  Food	  Security	  2012).	  The	  concept	  of	  food	  security	  rest	  on	  four	  pillars,	  which	  include:	  availability,	  access,	  
utilization	  and	  stability.	  The	  pillars	  represent	  different	  dimensions	  of	  food	  security	  and	  are	  measured	  by	  various	  different	  indicators.	  Both	  within	  the	  academic	  literature	  and	  among	  international	  organizations	  specializing	  in	  food	  security,	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  differing	  opinions	  on	  what	  sorts	  under	  the	  different	  pillars.	  This	  is	  not	  very	  surprising	  however,	  since	  there	  are	  no	  clear	  lines	  between	  the	  various	  dimensions	  of	  food	  security,	  which	  in	  many	  aspects	  are	  overlapping	  (Committee	  of	  World	  Food	  Security	  2012).	  For	  quite	  some	  time	  the	  dominating	  focus	  within	  food	  security	  was	  on	  the	  dimension	  of	  
food	  availability	  in	  terms	  of	  adequate	  production	  at	  the	  global	  and	  national	  level	  (Clover	  2003:7).	  This	  perspective	  was,	  however,	  challenged	  by	  Amartya	  Sen	  in	  the	  1980’s,	  who	  came	  to	  switch	  the	  focus	  towards	  the	  issues	  of	  inadequate	  access	  to	  food.	  He	  argued	  that	  starvation	  can	  occur	  even	  though	  a	  country	  is	  food	  secure	  on	  the	  national	  level	  due	  to	  the	  population’s	  lack	  of	  ability	  to	  acquire	  food.	  He	  introduced	  the	  perspective	  of	  inequality	  within	  food	  security	  by	  acknowledging	  the	  differences	  between	  different	  social	  groups	  and	  pressing	  the	  fact	  that	  vulnerable	  groups	  starve	  when	  they	  don’t	  have	  access	  to	  enough	  food,	  often	  despite	  the	  availability	  of	  food	  for	  other	  groups	  who	  can	  afford	  it	  (Sen	  1981	  &	  Baro	  &	  Deubel	  2006:523).	  
”Starvation	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  some	  people	  not	  having	  enough	  food	  to	  eat	  and	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  there	  
being	  not	  enough	  food	  to	  eat”,	  he	  has	  stated	  (1981:434).	  This	  claim	  has	  been	  confirmed	  in	  a	  range	  of	  recent	  studies	  (Kennedy	  and	  Haddad	  1992,	  Sen	  1981),	  establishing	  that	  widespread	  hunger	  is	  common	  even	  countries	  producing	  surplus	  food	  for	  export	  (Diskin	  1995:23).	  Food	  security	  today	  is	  mainly	  an	  issue	  of	  access	  to	  food,	  which	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  study.	  	  Access	  to	  food,	  and	  in	  particular	  discrepancies	  between	  food	  availability	  and	  food	  access,	  could	  be	  of	  specific	  interest	  when	  investigating	  the	  role	  of	  QoG	  in	  food	  security,	  as	  this	  relates	  to	  failures	  in	  distribution	  of	  food	  to	  certain	  parts	  of	  the	  population.	  	  
	  




Figure	  1.	  Conceptual	  framework	  for	  food	  security	  
 
 
 	  Source:	  	  UNICEF	  (1990)	  and	  Frankenberger	  et	  al.	  (1997)	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  Access	  to	  food	  is	  by	  the	  FAO	  defined	  as:	  “Access	  by	  individuals	  to	  adequate	  resources	  
(entitlements)	  for	  acquiring	  appropriate	  foods	  for	  a	  nutritious	  diet.	  Entitlements	  are	  
defined	  as	  the	  set	  of	  all	  commodity	  bundles	  over	  which	  a	  person	  can	  establish	  command	  
given	  the	  legal,	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  arrangements	  of	  the	  community	  in	  which	  
they	  live	  (including	  traditional	  rights	  such	  as	  access	  to	  common	  resources)”	  (FAO	  2006).	  Food	  access	  consists	  of	  three	  elements:	  Physical	  access,	  economic	  access	  and	  socio-­
cultural	  access.	  	  Limited	  physical	  access	  to	  food	  can	  exist	  if	  food	  production	  is	  high	  in	  one	  part	  of	  a	  country,	  but	  can’t	  be	  delivered	  to	  another	  part	  suffering	  from	  food	  shortages	  due	  to	  ineffective	  or	  lacking	  infrastructure.	  Within	  the	  economic	  dimension	  food	  insecurity	  might	  exists	  when	  people	  can’t	  afford	  to	  buy	  a	  sufficient	  amount	  of	  food.	  Although	  food	  might	  be	  available,	  the	  people	  do	  not	  have	  enough	  financial	  resources	  to	  purchase	  it.	  	  Socio-­‐cultural	  aspects	  do	  also	  affect	  people’s	  access	  to	  food.	  Even	  if	  the	  food	  is	  physically	  available	  and	  the	  people	  have	  money	  to	  purchase	  it,	  they	  might	  be	  prevented	  from	  doing	  so	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  belong	  to	  ”the	  wrong”	  social	  group	  or	  because	  they	  are	  women	  for	  example.	  Not	  seldom,	  only	  access	  within	  an	  economic	  or	  financial	  context	  is	  taken	  into	  account,	  especially	  since	  the	  start	  of	  food	  price	  volatility	  in	  2008,	  while	  the	  socio-­‐cultural	  aspect	  has	  tended	  to	  end	  up	  in	  the	  background	  (Napoli	  2010).	  This	  study,	  however,	  relates	  to	  all	  three	  forms	  of	  food	  access,	  as	  governments	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  each	  of	  these	  categories.	  	  
Quality	  of	  Government	  Although	  Quality	  of	  Government	  is	  widely	  used	  by	  academics	  as	  well	  as	  practioners	  and	  included	  in	  a	  range	  of	  empirical	  indices,	  the	  conceptualisation	  of	  the	  term	  is	  not	  very	  precise.	  The	  definition	  central	  to	  this	  study	  is	  offered	  by	  Rothstein	  and	  Teorell	  (2008)	  who	  describe	  QoG	  as	  a	  concept	  of	  how	  a	  state	  succeeds	  in	  utilizing	  its’	  resources	  for	  the	  public	  good.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  output,	  meaning	  delivery	  if	  services	  to	  its	  citizenry,	  the	  definition	  also	  include	  that	  the	  services	  are	  exercised	  in	  an	  efficient	  and	  non-­‐corrupt	  way.	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3.2	  Operationalization	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  	  Inadequate	  access	  to	  food	  is	  by	  FAO	  measured	  by	  a	  number	  of	  indicators,	  one	  of	  them	  being	  ‘Prevalence	  of	  Undernourishment’	  (PoU).	  This	  particular	  indicator	  is	  the	  official	  measure	  for	  monitoring	  progress	  towards	  MDG1,	  as	  FAO	  at	  the	  1996	  World	  Food	  Summit,	  received	  the	  mandate	  for	  this	  very	  task.	  PoU	  is	  by	  FAO	  defined	  as:	  “the	  consumption	  of	  fewer	  than	  about	  1,800	  kilocalories	  a	  day	  
-­	  the	  minimum	  that	  most	  people	  require	  to	  live	  a	  healthy	  and	  productive	  life”	  (Von	  Grebmer	  2013).	  The	  PoU	  indicator	  is	  based	  on	  data	  from	  both	  food	  balance	  sheets,	  which	  provide	  essential	  information	  about	  the	  food	  system	  of	  a	  country,	  and	  household	  surveys,	  which	  are	  analyzed	  to	  create	  food	  security	  statistics	  at	  both	  national	  and	  sub-­‐national	  levels	  (FAO	  2014).	  PoU	  does	  not	  capture	  the	  impact	  of	  short-­‐term	  economic	  shocks	  (FAO,	  IFAD	  &	  WFP	  2013).	  The	  indicator	  presents	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment	  as	  percentage	  of	  the	  population	  being	  undernourished.	  The	  years	  included	  in	  this	  analysis	  are	  2010-­‐2012.	  
3.3	  Operationalization	  of	  the	  independent	  variables	  	  
	  Democracy	  is	  measured	  by	  Democracy	  Imputed	  Polity	  provided	  by	  Freedom	  House.	  The	  scale	  ranges	  from	  0-­‐10,	  0	  being	  least	  democratic	  and	  10	  most	  democratic.	  Average	  of	  Freedom	  House	  (fh_pr	  and	  fh_cl)	  is	  transformed	  to	  a	  0-­‐10	  scale	  and	  Polity	  (p_polity2)	  is	  transformed	  to	  a	  scale	  of	  0-­‐10.	  These	  two	  variables	  are	  then	  averaged	  into	  fh_polity2.	  The	  years	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  are	  2009-­‐2011.	  
	  Quality	  of	  Government	  can	  be	  measured	  by	  various	  indicators,	  and	  this	  study	  will	  focus	  on	  corruption,	  and	  more	  precisely	  the	  perception	  of	  corruption.	  The	  indicator	  of	  choice	  is	  the	  Corruption	  Perception	  Index	  (CPI)	  offered	  by	  Transparency	  International	  (TI).	  The	  measure	  includes	  corruption	  in	  the	  public	  sector,	  and	  corruption	  involving	  public	  officials,	  politicians	  and	  civil	  servants.	  	  It	  is	  based	  on	  questions	  relating	  to:	  ”The	  abuse	  of	  public	  power	  and	  focus	  on:	  bribery	  of	  
public	  officials,	  kickbacks	  in	  public	  procurement,	  embezzlement	  of	  public	  funds,	  and	  on	  
questions	  that	  probe	  the	  strength	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  anti-­corruption	  efforts	  in	  the	  public	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sector.	  As	  such,	  it	  covers	  both	  the	  administrative	  and	  political	  aspects	  of	  corruption”	  (Transparency	  International	  2014).	  The	  indicator	  ranges	  between	  10	  (highly	  clean)	  and	  0	  (highly	  corrupt),	  and	  the	  years	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  are	  2007-­‐2011.	  Using	  CPI	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  QoG	  should	  not	  be	  misinterpreted	  as	  stating	  that	  QoG	  should	  be	  defined	  only	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  corruption,	  as	  QoG	  is	  a	  broader	  term	  encompassing	  more	  aspects	  of	  governance.	  However,	  absence	  of	  corruption	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  crucial	  part	  of	  good	  quality	  of	  government	  and	  a	  suitable	  measure	  for	  this	  study.	  	  
3.4	  Operationalization	  of	  the	  control	  variables	  The	  indicator	  used	  to	  measure	  GDP	  is	  the	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  PPP	  (constant	  international	  $)	  indicator	  from	  the	  World	  Bank.	  The	  year	  covered	  is	  2009.	  Trade	  freedom	  is	  derived	  from	  Heritage	  Foundation	  and	  overall	  quality	  of	  infrastructure	  is	  provided	  by	  World	  Economic	  Forum.	  Population,	  political	  stability	  and	  poverty	  are	  all	  indicators	  from	  the	  World	  Bank.	  Poverty	  is	  measured	  as	  population	  below	  $1,25	  a	  day	  (%).	  The	  availability	  of	  sound	  and	  reliable	  data,	  covering	  as	  many	  countries	  as	  possible	  in	  order	  to	  offer	  possibilities	  of	  cross-­‐country	  comparisons	  have	  guided	  the	  choices	  of	  all	  the	  indicators	  above.	  All	  indicators	  included	  are	  derived	  from	  solid	  sources,	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank,	  FAO	  and	  similar	  International	  Organizations.	  All	  the	  IVs	  and	  CVs	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  Quality	  of	  Government	  Cross-­‐sectional	  Standard	  Dataset	  2013	  (Quality	  of	  Government	  Institute	  2014).	  The	  dependent	  variable	  (DV)	  was	  collected	  from	  the	  FAO	  Statistics	  Division	  FAOSTATS	  (FAOSTATS	  2014).	  	  
3.5	  Methodological	  approach	  This	  study	  is	  explanatory	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  investigate	  if	  the	  variance	  in	  undernourishment	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  level	  of	  democracy	  or	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  in	  a	  country.	  	  With	  inspiration	  from	  the	  debate	  on	  whether	  democracy	  or	  QoG	  provides	  human	  welfare	  and	  provide	  public	  goods,	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  test	  these	  theories	  from	  a	  food	  security	  perspective,	  based	  on	  existing	  food	  security	  literature.	  Hence,	  this	  is	  a	  theory	  testing	  study	  where	  a	  deductive	  approach	  is	  applied	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  the	  relationship	  between	  different	  dimensions	  of	  governance	  and	  access	  to	  food.	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The	  ambition	  is	  not	  to	  investigate	  a	  development	  over	  time,	  but	  rather	  to	  offer	  a	  comparison	  between	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  questions	  central	  to	  the	  study.	  The	  study	  intend	  to	  analyse	  the	  role	  of	  governance	  in	  terms	  of	  democracy	  and	  QoG,	  as	  structural	  underlying	  causes	  in	  food	  security,	  rather	  than	  to	  capture	  dynamic	  change,	  crises	  or	  shocks.	  Based	  on	  this,	  a	  cross-­‐sectional	  analysis	  will	  be	  carried	  out,	  as	  time-­‐series	  data	  is	  more	  sensitive	  to	  short-­‐run	  factors	  (Feng	  2005).	  The	  method	  of	  cross-­‐sectional	  analysis	  has	  over	  the	  years	  been	  used	  by	  a	  range	  of	  scholars	  within	  boarding	  fields	  of	  research,	  indicating	  that	  it	  is	  an	  established	  research	  method	  (Feng	  2005)	  The	  hypotheses	  are	  tested	  by	  carrying	  out	  a	  large-­‐n	  study,	  where	  the	  units	  of	  analysis	  include	  all	  developing	  countries	  in	  the	  world	  (see	  Appendix	  1	  for	  full	  list	  of	  countries),	  with	  exceptions	  of	  missing	  data	  and	  countries	  with	  PoU	  values	  under	  five	  percent.	  These	  countries	  have	  been	  excluded	  from	  the	  analysis,	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  FAO	  only	  provides	  a	  lumped	  number	  of	  PoU	  for	  all	  countries	  with	  values	  under	  five	  percent,	  which	  is	  presented	  as	  <5%	  (meaning	  anything	  between	  1	  to	  4%),	  whereas	  all	  countries	  with	  values	  above	  5%	  are	  presented	  as	  the	  exact	  percentage	  of	  the	  population,	  making	  it	  complicated	  to	  include	  the	  ‘below	  five	  countries’	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  A	  valid	  question	  to	  ask	  is	  if	  the	  results	  would	  have	  turned	  out	  differently	  if	  these	  countries	  were	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  and	  perhaps	  coded	  as	  2,5%	  and	  maybe	  they	  would	  slightly,	  but	  since	  the	  main	  interest	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  investigate	  what	  effects	  access	  to	  food	  in	  the	  development	  world,	  countries	  which	  does	  not	  face	  a	  severe	  challenge	  of	  undernourishment	  are	  not	  the	  countries	  of	  greatest	  interest	  (after	  all,	  0-­‐5%	  is	  quite	  a	  low	  value).	  Naturally	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  dropped	  slightly,	  but	  considering	  the	  number	  of	  observations	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  after	  all,	  this	  did	  not	  cause	  any	  greater	  implications.	  The	  statistical	  method	  applied	  is	  regression	  analysis,	  which	  is	  a	  useful	  method	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  research	  questions	  of	  this	  study	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  can	  establish	  a	  possible	  linear	  relationship	  between	  two	  or	  more	  variables.	  In	  addition	  it	  offers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  predict	  values	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  (DV)	  based	  on	  values	  on	  the	  independent	  variables	  (IVs)	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  (Field	  2009:198).	  Unlike	  correlation	  analysis,	  it	  is	  then	  possible	  to	  predict	  the	  level	  of	  undernourishment	  based	  on	  the	  level	  of	  democracy	  or	  corruption,	  in	  this	  case.	  Knowledge	  of	  this	  kind	  could	  be	  valuable	  when	  working	  towards	  set	  goals,	  such	  as	  the	  MDGs	  for	  example.	  Although	  a	  few	  similar	  studies	  have	  been	  carried	  out,	  to	  my	  knowledge,	  no	  large-­‐n	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studies	  have	  been	  conducted.	  Also,	  the	  main	  focus	  within	  previous	  research	  has	  been	  on	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa,	  and	  although	  that	  is	  a	  region	  suffering	  hard	  from	  food	  insecurity,	  and	  in	  particular	  famines,	  insufficient	  access	  to	  food	  is	  a	  global	  challenge	  affecting	  many	  regions,	  motivating	  a	  global	  approach.	  
Figure	  2.	  Undernourishment	  in	  the	  developing	  regions	  and	  undernourishment	  by	  region.	  	  
Source:	  FAO	  Statistics	  Division	  (ESS),	  FAO	  Global	  Administrative	  Unit	  Layers	  (GAUL),	  ETOPO1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (National	  Geophysical	  Data	  Center),	  FAO	  Land	  and	  Water	  Division	  (NRL)	  2011-­‐2013.	  	   The	  cross-­‐section	  year	  in	  the	  dataset	  used	  for	  the	  independent	  variables	  and	  control	  variables	  (CVs)	  is	  2002	  to	  2009	  (or	  the	  closest	  year	  available).	  The	  data	  for	  the	  dependent	  variable	  covers	  2010-­‐2012.	  	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  approach	  the	  issue	  of	  reversed	  causality,	  the	  variables	  have	  been	  lagged	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  are	  at	  least	  one	  year	  and	  at	  the	  most	  ten	  years	  between	  the	  IVs	  and	  the	  DV.	  	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  one	  year	  is	  not	  sufficient	  in	  order	  to	  detect	  the	  effect	  of	  corruption	  or	  democracy	  on	  undernourishment,	  since	  changes	  in	  corruption	  or	  democracy,	  and	  the	  possible	  effects	  of	  those	  changes,	  does	  not	  happen	  over	  night.	  However,	  a	  -­‐1	  year	  method	  of	  lagging	  is	  quite	  common	  within	  social	  science	  research	  (Bäck	  and	  Hadenius	  2008).	  In	  addition,	  in	  ten	  years	  we	  could	  possibly	  expect	  some	  kind	  of	  change.	  It	  should	  also	  be	  underlined	  that	  this	  is	  not	  an	  effort	  completely	  rule	  out	  reversed	  causality,	  but	  rather	  to	  approach	  the	  issue	  and	  try	  to	  lower	  the	  risk.	  A	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further	  discussion	  on	  reversed	  causality	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  chapter	  on	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  analysis	  further	  ahead.	  The	  empirical	  analysis	  will	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  three	  main	  regression	  models.	  The	  first	  and	  main	  one	  is	  a	  multivariate	  regression	  aiming	  to	  explore	  the	  effect	  of	  democracy	  on	  undernourishment	  as	  well	  as	  the	  effect	  of	  corruption	  on	  undernourishment,	  while	  controlling	  for	  GDP.	  In	  a	  second	  model,	  the	  above	  mentioned	  relationships	  will	  be	  further	  explored	  in	  a	  multivariate	  regression	  model	  with	  an	  interaction	  term.	  In	  a	  third	  and	  last	  model,	  additional	  control	  variables	  will	  be	  included	  in	  a	  multivariate	  regression	  to	  challenge	  corruption	  as	  an	  explanatory	  factor	  of	  undernourishment.	  These	  variables	  have	  been	  picked	  out	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  have	  been	  put	  forward	  as	  possible	  explanations	  to	  undernourishment	  within	  previous	  research.	  All	  the	  statistical	  analysis	  has	  been	  carried	  out	  in	  SPSS.	  	  
4.	  Empirical	  findings	  and	  analysis	  
	  
In	  the	  following	  chapter,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  main	  statistical	  analysis,	  exploring	  the	  
relationship	  between	  democracy,	  QoG	  and	  undernourishment,	  including	  diagnostic	  
statistics	  of	  the	  model	  will	  be	  presented.	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  further	  investigation	  of	  the	  
relationship,	  as	  well	  as	  competing	  explanations	  of	  what	  effects	  undernourishment.	  	  
At	  last,	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  the	  overall	  data	  and	  analysis	  will	  
take	  place.	  	  Initially,	  a	  bivariate	  regression,	  is	  carried	  out	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  the	  relationship	  between	  democracy	  and	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment.	  The	  choice	  to	  commence	  the	  analysis	  by	  including	  democracy	  as	  the	  first	  independent	  variable	  is	  based	  on	  the	  overall	  theoretical	  arguments	  of	  this	  study.	  Although	  the	  main	  relationship	  of	  interest	  is	  the	  one	  between	  corruption	  and	  undernourishment,	  based	  on	  the	  theoretical	  arguments	  within	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  democracy	  for	  food	  security,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  first	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  democracy	  on	  its	  own	  and	  then	  move	  on	  to	  corruption.	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Formula	  for	  the	  main	  relationship	  to	  be	  explored:	  	  PoU	  =	  b0	  +	  b1	  Dem	  b2	  CPI	  +	  b3	  GDP	  +e	  
	  As	  evident	  in	  model	  1	  in	  the	  regression	  table	  below,	  the	  effect	  of	  democracy	  on	  PoU	  is	  not	  significant,	  so,	  no	  relationship	  can	  be	  established.	  	  In	  model	  2,	  the	  variable	  CPI	  is	  added	  to	  the	  multivariate	  analysis.	  The	  effect	  of	  corruption	  on	  PoU	  proves	  negative	  and	  significant	  with	  a	  b-­‐coefficient	  of	  -­‐,092.	  Keeping	  in	  mind	  the	  reversed	  scale	  of	  CPI	  (0	  being	  highly	  corrupt	  and	  10	  being	  highly	  clean),	  this	  suggest	  that	  the	  higher	  level	  of	  perceived	  corruption	  in	  a	  country,	  the	  higher	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment.	  The	  b-­‐coefficient	  of	  -­‐,092	  indicates	  that	  one	  unit	  change	  in	  the	  independent	  variable,	  results	  in	  a	  -­‐,092	  change	  in	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  In	  this	  case,	  if	  a	  country	  becomes	  “one	  step”	  less	  corrupt	  on	  the	  CPI	  scale	  (say,	  a	  move	  from	  3	  to	  4),	  the	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment	  drops	  by	  ,092%.	  This	  may	  not	  seem	  like	  a	  big	  change,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  PoU	  scale	  ranges	  from	  0-­‐100%	  of	  the	  population	  being	  undernourished.	  Whereas	  no	  countries	  have	  a	  100%	  undernourished	  population,	  the	  mean	  value	  for	  the	  developing	  countries	  in	  2010-­‐2010	  was	  14,7%	  of	  the	  population.	  Hence,	  if	  a	  country	  moves	  from	  being	  highly	  corrupt	  (1)	  to	  highly	  clean	  (10),	  the	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment	  in	  that	  country	  drops	  by	  nearly	  1%.	  In	  a	  country	  with	  15%	  PoU,	  that	  would	  mean	  a	  decrease	  to	  approximately	  14%.	  The	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  value	  is	  ,128,	  meaning	  that	  nearly	  13%	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  the	  dependent	  variable	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  independent	  variable.	  In	  other	  words,	  13%	  of	  PoU	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  CPI.	  	  At	  this	  point	  of	  the	  analysis	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  corruption	  does	  in	  fact	  affect	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment,	  and	  it	  does	  so	  to	  a	  larger	  extent	  than	  democracy,	  since	  democracy	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  at	  all.	  In	  model	  3,	  the	  control	  variable	  GDP	  per	  capita	  is	  introduced	  in	  the	  model,	  but	  without	  offering	  significant	  results,	  while	  CPI	  stays	  significant.	  This	  result	  is	  somewhat	  surprising	  as	  GDP	  in	  many	  cases	  have	  proven	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  most	  dependent	  variables	  connected	  to	  development	  and	  human	  welfare	  within	  social	  sciences,	  and	  even	  though	  it	  is	  not	  a	  main	  indicator	  of	  interest	  to	  this	  study,	  it	  was	  still	  expected	  to	  have	  some	  kind	  of	  effect	  on	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment.	  Corruption	  playing	  a	  larger	  role	  than	  growth	  (which	  seem	  to	  not	  have	  an	  affect	  at	  all)	  in	  food	  security	  is	  a	  quite	  interesting	  finding.	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In	  addition,	  a	  robustness	  check	  is	  carried	  out	  in	  order	  to	  strengthen	  the	  model	  and	  the	  results	  produced.	  CPI	  is	  replaced	  by	  the	  Control	  of	  Corruption	  indicator	  offered	  by	  the	  World	  Bank.	  As	  evident,	  the	  results	  still	  imply	  that	  corruption	  does	  affect	  Prevalence	  of	  Undernourishment,	  strengthening	  the	  results	  of	  the	  analysis.	  	  	  
Table 1. Multivariate regression analysis. Prevalence of Undernourishment. 
 
Prevalence of Undernourishment (0-100%)  Model 1   Model 2 Model 3 Robustness          
 (bivariate)    
 
Democracy Imputed Polity (0-10)  -,015 ,006 ,004 ,005 
                                       (,010) (,012) (,013) (,013) 
 
Corruption Perception Index (0-10)  -,092*** -,082*** -,123**
  (,025) (,031) (,058) 
    
  
GDP per capita, PPP, constant international $    , 000 ,000 
   (,031) (,000) 
 
Intercept  1,374*** 1,536*** 1,526*** 1,218***
 (,069) ( ,077) (,084) (,109) 
 
Adjusted R2  ,011 ,128 ,091 ,097
    
N  100 97 92 95 
*p<0.10 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. Standard errors within parentheses. Data: The QoG standard dataset, Quality of 
Government Institute Database 2013. At	  this	  point	  in	  the	  empirical	  analysis,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  IVs	  and	  the	  DV,	  while	  controlling	  for	  GDP.	  Additional	  control	  variables	  based	  on	  competing	  explanations	  within	  research	  of	  the	  variance	  of	  undernourishment	  will	  be	  included	  further	  ahead,	  but	  first	  follows	  diagnostics	  of	  the	  model	  and	  a	  further	  investigation	  of	  the	  two	  main	  relationships	  of	  interest	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  interaction	  model.	  
	  
Diagnostics	  of	  the	  model	  Diagnostics	  of	  the	  model	  is	  carried	  out	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  how	  well	  the	  model	  fits	  the	  actual	  data,	  which	  is	  done	  by	  investigating	  if	  any	  statistical	  assumptions	  are	  violated	  (Field	  2009:214).	  In	  this	  case,	  most	  of	  the	  assumptions	  turned	  out	  not	  to	  be	  violated	  by	  the	  data	  in	  the	  model.	  However,	  the	  distribution	  of	  errors	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  turned	  out	  not	  to	  be	  normal,	  but	  positively	  skewed,	  when	  running	  a	  frequency	  distribution	  (creating	  a	  graph	  plotting	  values	  of	  observations	  on	  the	  x	  axis)	  to	  analyse	  the	  data	  on	  prevalence	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of	  undernourishment.	  In	  order	  to	  get	  a	  more	  normally	  distributed	  dependent	  variable,	  the	  PoU	  variable	  was	  transformed	  using	  the	  log10	  method.	  Although	  not	  perfectly	  normally	  distributed,	  the	  transformed	  variable	  now	  has	  z	  values	  for	  both	  skewness	  and	  kurtosis	  under	  1,96	  (see	  Appendix	  2).	  Another	  assumption	  issue	  of	  concern	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  when	  investing	  the	  linearity	  between	  each	  of	  the	  IVs	  and	  the	  main	  control	  variable	  and	  the	  dependent	  variable	  by	  plotting	  them,	  as	  it	  turns	  out,	  none	  of	  the	  relationships	  seem	  to	  be	  linear.	  This	  could	  mean	  that	  a	  standard	  OLS	  multivariate	  regression	  analysis	  might	  not	  be	  the	  most	  suitable	  method	  to	  examine	  these	  relationships.	  Based	  on	  this,	  it	  could	  be	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  investigate	  the	  relationship	  by	  introducing	  another	  statistical	  model,	  which	  is	  carried	  out	  further	  ahead.	  Some	  extra	  attention	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  high	  leverage	  values,	  meaning	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  observed	  value	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  over	  the	  predicted	  values	  (Field	  2009:217).	  Depending	  on	  what	  recommendation	  of	  statistical	  threshold	  applied,	  the	  problem	  of	  these	  cases	  are	  less	  or	  more	  prominent.	  If	  using	  the	  formula	  recommended	  by	  Hoaglin	  and	  Welsch	  (1978)	  (2	  x	  number	  of	  IVs	  +	  1)/n,	  15	  observations	  falls	  below	  the	  high	  leverage	  cut-­‐off-­‐point.	  When	  applying	  the	  formula	  recommended	  by	  Stevens	  (3	  x	  number	  of	  IVs	  +	  1)/n),	  however,	  only	  seven	  cases	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  a	  high	  leverage	  (Stevens	  2002,	  Field	  2009:217).	  Although	  it	  is	  problematic	  to	  exclude	  cases	  from	  an	  analysis	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons,	  one	  way	  to	  explore	  the	  unproportional	  influence	  could	  be	  to	  exclude	  them	  from	  the	  regression	  model.	  When	  excluding	  these	  seven	  cases,	  CPI	  does	  still	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  PoU.	  	  To	  further	  ensure	  that	  these	  cases	  do	  not	  influence	  the	  coefficient	  in	  a	  misleading	  manner,	  checks	  including	  Cook’s	  distance,	  Mahalanois	  and	  DFBeta	  were	  applied	  to	  the	  15	  cases	  with	  high	  leverage	  according	  to	  the	  Hoaglin	  and	  Welsch	  threshold.	  These	  are	  all	  additional	  checks	  to	  ensure	  that	  no	  cases	  have	  a	  large	  effect	  on	  the	  model.	  No	  cases	  has	  a	  Cook’s	  distance	  value	  greater	  than	  one,	  all	  are	  well	  below	  the	  threshold	  for	  what	  should	  be	  considered	  problematic.	  Same	  goes	  for	  the	  DFBeta	  check,	  where	  no	  cases	  have	  an	  absolute	  value	  above	  one.	  However,	  seven	  cases	  had	  Mahalanobis	  values	  above	  15,	  which	  could	  possibly	  be	  problematic	  for	  the	  model	  (Field	  2009:217-­‐219).	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  When	  excluding	  these	  cases,	  CPI	  again	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  significant,	  with	  a	  b-­‐coefficient	  of	  -­‐,057.	  It	  is	  also	  of	  importance	  to	  press	  that	  high	  leverage	  cases	  do	  not	  necessarily	  signify	  a	  large	  influence	  on	  the	  regression	  coefficients,	  since	  they	  are	  measured	  on	  the	  dependent	  variables,	  not	  the	  independent	  variables	  (Field	  217).	  In	  addition,	  it	  should	  be	  mentioned	  that	  none	  of	  the	  92	  observations	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  have	  both	  high	  leverage	  and	  a	  high	  student	  residual	  (outliers),	  which	  implies	  that	  we	  to	  some	  extent	  can	  be	  confident	  in	  the	  results	  although	  the	  seven	  cases	  above	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  high	  influence.	  	  	  Assumptions	  are	  of	  importance	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  generalize	  the	  results	  beyond	  the	  sample	  included	  in	  the	  model	  (Field	  2009:251).	  Since	  all	  development	  countries	  of	  the	  world	  (with	  the	  exceptions	  mentioned	  above),	  are	  included	  in	  the	  analysis,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  not	  of	  as	  great	  of	  an	  importance	  in	  this	  case,	  where	  the	  sample	  is	  more	  or	  less	  the	  same	  as	  the	  population,	  compared	  to	  if	  it	  would	  have	  been	  the	  case	  of	  30	  surveys	  conducted	  in	  the	  rural	  areas	  of	  Tanzania	  with	  the	  ambition	  to	  generalize	  the	  findings	  to	  the	  developing	  world	  at	  large.	  
	  
Interaction	  model	  In	  order	  to	  investigate	  the	  relationship	  between	  democracy,	  corruption	  and	  undernourishment	  further,	  an	  interaction	  term	  was	  added	  to	  the	  analysis.	  In	  this	  study,	  this	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  “give	  democracy	  another	  chance”	  and	  not	  rule	  it	  out	  as	  an	  explanatory	  variable	  too	  early.	  It	  is	  a	  method	  to	  examine	  how	  two	  or	  more	  independent	  variables	  work	  together	  to	  impact	  the	  outcome	  variable.	  Thereby,	  it	  offers	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  IVs	  and	  the	  DV.	  In	  addition,	  an	  omitted	  interaction	  effect	  in	  a	  model,	  where	  an	  effect	  actually	  exists	  could	  lead	  to	  important	  results	  being	  missed	  (Kasim	  2008).	  The	  regression	  with	  an	  interaction	  term	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is	  carried	  out	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  if	  democracy	  could	  possibly	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  undernourishment,	  dependent	  on	  the	  level	  of	  corruption.	  	  From	  a	  theoretical	  perspective,	  this	  examination	  is	  interesting	  for	  this	  study	  based	  on	  the	  Diamond	  argument,	  stating	  that	  democracy	  is	  hunted	  by	  the	  bad	  governance	  ghost	  (Diamond	  2007).	  So,	  if	  the	  ghost	  is	  not	  there	  or	  if	  the	  ghost	  is	  weak,	  could	  democracy	  have	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  hunger	  reduction?	  Could	  there,	  despite	  the	  results	  of	  the	  regression	  analysis,	  be	  a	  non-­‐linear	  effect	  of	  democracy	  on	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment,	  which	  is	  conditional	  upon	  the	  level	  of	  corruption?	  Put	  in	  another	  way,	  can	  we	  expect	  different	  effects	  of	  democracy	  on	  undernourishment	  in	  corrupt	  and	  in	  non-­‐corrupt	  settings?	  The	  theoretical	  idea	  can	  be	  visualized	  as	  in	  the	  figure	  below.	  
	  
Figure	  3.	  The	  effect	  of	  democracy	  on	  undernourishment,	  dependent	  on	  corruption.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  conduct	  a	  regression	  analysis	  with	  interaction	  terms,	  CPI	  is	  recoded	  into	  a	  dummy	  variable,	  where	  0	  equals	  corrupt	  and	  1	  equals	  not	  corrupt.	  0-­‐	  4,9	  on	  the	  original	  CPI	  scale	  was	  recoded	  into	  0	  and	  5-­‐10	  was	  recoded	  into	  1.	  This	  was	  not	  based	  on	  some	  universal	  threshold	  of	  when	  a	  country	  turns	  ‘not	  corrupt’,	  as	  no	  such	  definite	  division	  exist,	  but	  the	  variable	  was	  simply	  split	  in	  the	  middle	  into	  two	  categories.	  This	  method	  can	  be	  motivated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  CPI	  variable	  has	  an	  ordinal	  scale,	  where	  the	  distance	  between	  0	  and	  1	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  distance	  between	  9	  and	  10.	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In	  addition,	  an	  interaction	  term,	  also	  called	  a	  moderator	  variable,	  is	  created	  by	  multiplying	  democracy	  with	  the	  corruption	  dummy	  (dem*CPIdummy).	  In	  this	  way	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  examine	  how	  large	  the	  effect	  of	  democracy	  is	  on	  undernourishment	  when	  corruption	  is	  0	  and	  when	  it	  is	  1.	  If	  this	  effect	  is	  to	  differ,	  that	  would	  indicate	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  democracy	  depends	  on	  if	  a	  country	  is	  corrupt	  or	  not	  (Field	  2009:302-­‐303).	  Interaction	  model	  formula:	  PoU=	  a	  +	  b1	  Dem	  +	  b2	  CPI+	  b3	  Dem*CPI+	  e	  When	  adding	  only	  the	  corruption	  dummy	  variable	  to	  the	  analysis	  in	  model	  4,	  not	  very	  surprisingly,	  it	  turned	  out	  significant	  with	  a	  b-­‐coefficient	  of	  -­‐,204.	  	  However,	  when	  introducing	  the	  interaction	  term	  to	  the	  analysis	  in	  model	  5,	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  results	  what	  so	  ever.	  Even	  the	  significant	  effect	  of	  the	  dummy	  variable	  disappeared.	  It	  is	  quite	  obvious,	  from	  these	  results,	  that	  there	  is	  no	  effect	  of	  democracy	  on	  undernourishment,	  conditioned	  upon	  corruption	  levels.	  Interaction	  terms	  imposes	  high	  levels	  of	  multicollinearity,	  which	  tends	  result	  in	  insignificant	  effects,	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  effects	  tend	  to	  “eat	  each	  other	  up”.	  This	  could	  possibly	  explain	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  the	  significant	  results	  disappeared	  in	  model	  5.	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Table 2. Multivariate regression analysis with interaction term. Prevalence of 
undernourishment. 
 
Prevalence of Undernourishment (0-100%)  Model 4   Model 5 
   
 
Democracy Imputed Polity (0-10)   ,006 ,003 
  (,012) (,012)  
    
GDP per capita, PPP, constant international $ ,000 ,000  
 (,000) (,000)  
    
Corruption Perception Index (0-1) -,204* -,475 
 (,108) (,382) 
 
Dem*Corruption Perception Index    ,032  
  (,043)   
 
Intercept   1,361*** 1,376*** 
 (,073) (,076)  
  
 
Adjusted R2  ,126 ,121  
    
N  90 90   
*p<0.10 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. Standard errors within parentheses. Data: The QoG standard dataset, Quality of 
Government Institute Database 2013. 	  
Additional	  variables	  An	  additional	  statistical	  model	  was	  carried	  out,	  including	  more	  control	  variables,	  based	  on	  competing	  explanations	  of	  food	  insecurity	  within	  existing	  research.	  The	  variables	  added	  to	  the	  overall	  analysis	  are	  poverty,	  freedom	  of	  trade,	  political	  stability,	  infrastructure	  and	  population.	  Population	  is	  included	  based	  on	  the	  logic	  that	  the	  more	  people,	  the	  less	  food	  for	  each	  and	  one	  of	  them,	  often	  based	  on	  the	  argument	  that	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  food	  on	  this	  planet	  for	  all,	  especially	  considering	  the	  growing	  populations	  around	  our	  globe.	  Added	  to	  those	  analyses	  are	  often	  trade,	  due	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  if	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  food	  within	  the	  country	  for	  all	  its	  citizens,	  at	  least	  the	  country	  can	  import	  food.	  Infrastructure	  is	  commonly	  expected	  to	  affect	  access	  to	  food	  due	  to	  distributional	  concerns,	  and	  so	  is	  political	  instability.	  If	  people	  are	  poor,	  they	  can’t	  purchase	  food	  even	  if	  it	  is	  distributed,	  hence	  poverty	  is	  often	  mentioned	  as	  a	  determinant	  of	  food	  insecurity.	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  Formula	  for	  the	  model	  with	  additional	  control	  variables:	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Table 3. Multivariate regression analysis with additional control variables. Prevalence of 
Undernourishment. 
 
Prevalence of  
Undernourishment (0-100%)      Model 6         Model 7         Model 8          Model 9      Model 10       Model 11 
   
 
Corruption Perception  -,085*** -,082*** -,082** -,097*** ,-098** -,105** 
Index (0-10) (,021) (,033) (,034) (,035) (,043) (,048) 
 
Poverty   ,003** ,003** ,003* ,003** ,003* 
(% of the population)  (,001) (,001) (,001) (,002) (,002) 
  
 
Population    ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
 (,000) (,000) (,000) (,000)    
 
Trade Freedom         ,005 ,005 ,005 
     (,004) (,004) (,004)
     
Infrastructure (1-7)      ,015 ,013 
      (,060) (,061) 
 
Political Stability       ,019 
    (,057) 
 
Intercept   1,552*** 1,478*** ,1478*** 1,182*** 1,100***      1,154*** 
  (,071) (,118) (,120) (,281) (,337) (,376)
       
Adjusted R2  ,135 ,195 ,179 ,200 ,181 ,162
    
N  97 52 52 50 46 46 
*p<0.10 ** p<0.05 ***p<0.01. Standard errors within parentheses. Data: The QoG standard dataset, Quality of 
Government Institute Database 2013. All	  other	  variables	  are	  explanations	  to	  food	  insecurity	  often	  lifted	  in	  existing	  research,	  therefore	  the	  results	  showing	  that	  none	  of	  them	  seem	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment	  is	  both	  surprising	  and	  interesting.	  	  One	  possible	  explanation	  could	  be	  that	  corruption	  actually	  carries	  the	  effect	  of	  other	  variables	  or	  that	  corruption	  is	  the	  true	  explanation	  behind	  other	  explanations.	  Research	  has	  for	  example	  shown	  that	  corruption	  affects	  economic	  and	  governance	  factors,	  such	  as	  lower	  quality	  of	  infrastructure	  (Chetwynd,	  Chetwynd	  and	  Spector	  2003).	  This	  could	  possibly	  also	  be	  the	  case	  for	  political	  stability.	  Another	  explanation	  could	  be	  that	  different	  indicators	  affect	  different	  dimensions	  of	  food	  security.	  It	  could	  be	  the	  case	  where	  population	  and	  trade	  affects	  food	  availability	  in	  countries,	  while	  corruption	  and	  poverty	  plays	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  actual	  access	  to	  food.	  This	  result	  is	  of	  particular	  interest	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  food	  availability	  is	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not	  the	  main	  food	  security	  issue,	  it	  is	  rather	  an	  issue	  of	  food	  access	  for	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  groups	  within	  societies.	  Although	  a	  country	  has	  food	  available	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  it	  might	  not	  reach	  the	  poor	  and	  vulnerable	  groups	  due	  to	  their	  inability	  to	  buy	  it	  in	  the	  market	  or	  access	  it	  due	  to	  corrupted	  officials.	  	  
4.1	  Summary	  of	  results	  
	  The	  bivariate	  regression	  analysis	  between	  democracy	  and	  undernourishment	  did	  not	  establish	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  variables.	  However,	  the	  level	  of	  perception	  of	  corruption	  turned	  out	  to	  have	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  undernourishment.	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  if	  a	  country	  becomes	  one	  step	  less	  corrupt	  on	  the	  CPI	  scale,	  the	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment	  drops	  by	  ,092%.	  The	  adjusted	  R2	  value	  could	  also	  tell	  us	  that	  11%	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  level	  of	  corruption.	  Quite	  surprisingly,	  the	  control	  variable	  of	  GDP	  per	  capita	  did	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment.	  	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  investigate	  the	  relationship	  between	  democracy,	  corruption	  and	  undernourishment	  further,	  an	  interaction	  model	  was	  applied.	  The	  results,	  however,	  did	  reject	  a	  possible	  interaction	  effect	  of	  democracy	  on	  undernourishment,	  conditioned	  upon	  the	  level	  of	  corruption.	  	  In	  a	  third	  model	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  explanatory	  variables,	  based	  on	  previous	  literature,	  were	  added	  to	  the	  analysis	  in	  an	  attempt	  challenge	  corruption	  as	  an	  explanation	  to	  the	  variance	  in	  undernourishment	  and	  possibly	  detect	  other	  factors	  of	  importance.	  Added	  to	  the	  regression	  analysis	  were:	  poverty,	  trade,	  political	  stability,	  infrastructure	  and	  population.	  None	  of	  the	  control	  variables	  proved	  significant,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  poverty	  with	  a	  b-­‐coefficient	  of	  ,003.	  CPI	  stayed	  significant	  throughout	  the	  model	  with	  a	  b-­‐coefficient	  of	  -­‐,105 in	  the	  model	  with	  all	  control	  variables	  included.	  When	  adding	  poverty	  to	  the	  model	  the	  explanatory	  power	  raised	  from	  11%	  to	  16%.	  Based	  on	  the	  statistical	  analysis	  carried	  out,	  the	  two	  research	  questions	  of	  this	  study	  can	  be	  answered:	  
Yes,	  Quality	  of	  Government	  does	  affect	  access	  to	  food.	  	  
Yes,	  Quality	  of	  Government	  does	  play	  a	  larger	  role	  in	  ensuring	  access	  to	  food	  than	  
democracy.	  In	  fact,	  democracy	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  access	  to	  food.	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The	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  statistical	  analysis	  failed	  to	  falsify	  the	  first	  two	  hypothesis	  (H1	  and	  H2),	  as	  the	  results	  suggests	  that	  democracy	  does	  not	  affect	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment,	  but	  QoG	  does.	  The	  third	  hypothesis	  (H3),	  however,	  was	  falsified	  as	  democracy	  did	  not	  at	  all	  prove	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  access	  to	  food.	  	  
4.2	  Strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  	  
Data	  and	  measurements	  When	  evaluating	  the	  strength	  and	  weakness	  of	  an	  analysis,	  two	  main	  things	  to	  reflect	  upon	  is	  the	  validity	  and	  reliability,	  relating	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  measurement	  used.	  Validity	  refers	  to	  if	  an	  instrument	  actually	  measures	  what	  it	  is	  set	  out	  to	  measure.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  does	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment	  really	  measure	  access	  to	  food?	  Reliability	  means	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  measure	  to	  provide	  the	  same	  results	  under	  the	  same	  conditions	  (Field	  2009:11-­‐12).	  	  Prevalence	  of	  undernourishment	  is	  one	  of	  many	  food	  security	  indicators	  provided	  by	  FAO,	  where	  the	  somewhat	  20	  different	  indicators	  aims	  to	  capture	  various	  aspects	  of	  food	  insecurity.	  The	  choice	  of	  food	  security	  indicators	  is	  based	  on	  expert	  judgment	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  data	  with	  sufficient	  coverage,	  in	  order	  to	  carry	  out	  to	  comparisons	  across	  regions	  and	  over	  time	  (FAO2	  2014).	  	  PoU	  is	  one	  out	  of	  four	  indicators	  measuring	  inadequate	  access	  to	  food,	  and	  was	  chosen	  as	  the	  measure	  of	  this	  study	  based	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  the	  most	  frequently	  used	  as	  well	  as	  the	  indicator	  used	  to	  monitor	  progress	  towards	  MDG1	  both	  within	  research	  and	  the	  policy	  community.	  The	  choice	  of	  a	  widely	  used	  indicator	  provided	  by	  a	  well-­‐establish	  international	  organization	  with	  an	  expertise	  on	  food	  security	  issues	  provides	  a	  certain	  confidence	  on	  the	  validity	  and	  reliability	  of	  the	  measure.	  However,	  the	  PoU	  indicator	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  access	  to	  food	  has	  been	  criticized	  on	  a	  number	  of	  grounds.	  It	  has	  been	  accused	  for	  not	  sufficiently	  being	  able	  to	  capture	  changes	  over	  time	  and	  variance	  on	  a	  sub-­‐national	  level	  between	  households	  (Smith	  1998).	  	  Although	  realizing	  the	  limitation	  of	  such	  a	  measure	  it	  does	  not	  pose	  any	  severe	  weaknesses	  to	  this	  study,	  since	  the	  ambition	  has	  not	  been	  to	  capture	  changes	  over	  time	  and	  since	  the	  aim	  has	  been	  to	  compare	  countries,	  not	  sub-­‐national	  variance.	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  mentioned	  that	  the	  FAO	  measure	  does	  take	  into	  account	  the	  household	  level,	  as	  the	  indicator	  is	  partly	  based	  on	  household	  surveys,	  when	  creating	  the	  aggregated	  measure	  of	  PoU	  (FAOSTATS	  2014).	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Naturally	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  other	  possible	  measures	  when	  paying	  attention	  to	  food	  insecurity	  and	  hunger.	  One	  of	  them	  being	  famine	  mortality.	  However,	  since	  one	  intention	  for	  this	  study	  is	  to	  move	  away	  from	  the	  emergency	  approach	  to	  food	  security	  and	  switch	  focus	  to	  a	  more	  chronic	  form	  of	  hunger,	  measures	  such	  as	  famine	  mortality	  are	  not	  regarded	  as	  the	  most	  suitable.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  include	  people	  living	  on	  hungry	  stomachs,	  not	  only	  people	  dying	  of	  hunger.	  In	  addition,	  famines	  are	  increasingly	  concentrated	  to	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  (Devereux	  2000:3),	  hence,	  by	  moving	  away	  from	  emergency	  food	  insecurity,	  a	  much	  larger	  part	  of	  the	  world’s	  food	  insecure	  population	  could	  be	  covered.	  In	  order	  to	  grasp	  food	  security	  on	  a	  global	  level	  and	  for	  all	  developing	  countries,	  focus	  on	  another	  aspect	  of	  food	  insecurity	  is	  needed.	  In	  addition,	  data	  collected	  during	  crises	  tend	  to	  be	  less	  reliable	  than	  data	  that	  is	  not.	  Other	  measurement	  candidates	  are	  ‘undernutrition’	  or	  ‘malnutrition’.	  Undernutrition	  moves	  beyond	  calories	  and	  signifies	  deficiencies	  also	  in	  for	  example	  essential	  vitamins	  and	  minerals,	  while	  malnutrition	  refers	  to	  both	  undernutrition	  and	  overnutrition.	  	  These	  concepts	  are	  generally	  based	  on	  food-­‐related	  anthropometric	  data,	  such	  as	  ‘percentage	  of	  children	  under	  5	  years	  of	  age	  who	  are	  stunted’	  or	  ‘percentage	  of	  adults	  who	  are	  underweight’	  (WHO	  2014).	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  avoiding	  this	  data	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  fore	  a	  most	  measures	  of	  poor	  utilization	  of	  nutrients	  due	  to	  infection	  or	  illness,	  rather	  than	  access	  to	  food.	  It	  might	  in	  many	  cases	  be	  a	  result	  of	  an	  inadequate	  intake	  of	  food,	  but	  since	  it	  is	  affected	  by	  other	  factors	  as	  well,	  such	  as	  inadequate	  access	  to	  health	  services	  and	  inadequate	  maternal	  health	  practices	  it	  is	  not	  a	  straightforward	  measure	  of	  food	  insecurity	  in	  that	  sense.	  Hence,	  people	  might	  have	  access	  to	  food	  but	  due	  to	  other	  factors	  they	  do	  not	  utilize	  it.	  Also,	  anthropometric	  data	  is	  less	  available	  than	  other	  indicators	  and	  is	  more	  rarely	  updated	  on	  a	  regular	  basis,	  discouraging	  full	  comparisons	  across	  countries	  (Von	  Grebmer,	  K.,	  et	  al.	  2013).	  
The	  statistical	  analysis	  When	  assessing	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  statistical	  analysis,	  two	  questions	  are	  of	  great	  importance.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  if	  the	  model	  is	  an	  accurate	  representation	  of	  the	  actual	  data,	  or	  if	  it	  is	  influenced	  by	  a	  small	  number	  of	  cases	  (Field	  2009:11-­‐12).	  This	  was	  examined	  by	  carrying	  out	  statistical	  diagnostics	  in	  order	  to	  detect	  outliers,	  residuals	  and	  influential	  cases.	  No	  outliers	  or	  residuals	  could	  be	  noticed,	  but	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  with	  high	  leverage	  values	  existed.	  In	  order	  to	  investigate	  the	  role	  of	  these	  cases,	  they	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were	  excluded	  form	  the	  analysis,	  which	  proved	  to	  make	  no	  difference.	  Hence,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  the	  model	  fits	  the	  data	  reasonably	  well.	  	  The	  second	  question	  is	  of	  the	  model	  can	  be	  generalized	  to	  other	  samples	  (Field	  2009:11-­‐12).	  This	  was	  done	  by	  checking	  assumptions,	  meaning	  a	  number	  of	  statistical	  tests	  on	  the	  model.	  Most	  assumptions	  were	  not	  violated,	  however,	  the	  distribution	  of	  errors	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  as	  well	  as	  linearity	  between	  the	  IV	  and	  the	  DV	  was.	  This	  was	  dealt	  with	  by	  log	  transforming	  the	  dependent	  variable	  in	  order	  to	  get	  a	  more	  normal	  distribution	  and	  then	  examining	  if	  a	  regression	  model	  with	  interaction	  terms	  was	  a	  more	  suitable	  analysis	  to	  examine	  the	  seemingly	  non-­‐linear	  relationship,	  which	  it	  turned	  out	  not	  to	  be.	  When	  assumptions	  are	  violated,	  extra	  precaution	  is	  needed	  when	  generalizing	  the	  results.	  However,	  in	  this	  study,	  all	  developing	  countries	  are	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  cases	  with	  missing	  data),	  so	  this	  does	  not	  effect	  the	  analysis	  in	  quite	  the	  same	  way	  as	  it	  would	  have	  if	  only	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  countries	  were	  included	  in	  the	  sample.	  A	  central	  question	  to	  every	  statistical	  analysis	  is	  the	  one	  of	  reversed	  causality.	  How	  can	  we	  establish	  that	  the	  effect	  is	  not	  running	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction?	  In	  this	  study,	  how	  can	  we	  be	  sure	  that	  it	  isn’t	  in	  fact	  access	  to	  food	  affecting	  Quality	  of	  Government?	  	  The	  simple	  answer	  is	  that	  we	  can’t.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  lower	  levels	  of	  undernourishment,	  meaning	  stronger	  and	  healthier	  citizens,	  leads	  to	  greater	  opportunities	  to	  hold	  officials	  accountable	  and	  thereby	  resulting	  in	  better	  Quality	  of	  Government.	  	  However,	  based	  on	  previous	  literature	  and	  the	  arguments	  underpinning	  it,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  it	  most	  likely	  is	  QoG	  affecting	  undernourishment	  and	  not	  the	  other	  way	  around.	  A	  way	  to	  approach	  the	  challenge	  of	  reversed	  causality	  is	  to	  lag	  variables.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  independent	  variable	  and	  the	  main	  control	  variable	  were	  lagged	  -­‐1	  to	  -­‐14	  years,	  suggesting	  that	  changes	  in	  those	  variables	  happened	  before	  variance	  in	  the	  dependent	  variable	  occurred.	  This	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  bulletproof	  method	  to	  ensure	  the	  direction	  of	  effect,	  but	  it	  is	  indeed	  a	  way	  to	  approach	  the	  issue	  and	  decrease	  the	  risk	  of	  reversed	  causality.	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5.	  Concluding	  remarks	  In	  conclusion,	  this	  study	  has	  provided	  empirical	  results	  that	  could	  be	  of	  interest	  both	  on	  a	  research	  and	  a	  policy	  level	  within	  the	  development	  community.	  It	  suggests	  that	  food	  security	  is	  indeed	  a	  governance	  issue,	  and	  more	  specifically	  a	  governance	  output	  issue.	  The	  results	  indicate	  that	  there	  are	  legitimate	  reasons	  to	  question	  certain	  aspects	  of	  the	  literature	  promoting	  democracy	  as	  an	  important	  producer	  of	  human	  welfare	  and	  public	  goods	  provision,	  and	  swift	  focus	  to	  the	  Quality	  of	  Government.	  	  As	  corruption,	  in	  this	  analysis,	  proved	  to	  be	  the	  strongest	  determinant	  of	  access	  to	  food	  among	  a	  range	  of	  common	  and	  more	  traditional	  explanations	  put	  forward	  within	  the	  literature,	  future	  research	  on	  this	  very	  topic	  is	  both	  motivated	  and	  desirable.	  One	  task	  could	  be	  to	  examine	  how	  corruption	  affects	  access	  to	  food	  and	  through	  which	  
mechanisms.	  Based	  on	  the	  results	  of	  this	  study,	  it	  would	  also	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  investigate	  the	  interplay	  between	  corruption,	  poverty	  and	  undernourishment.	  	  Research	  on	  these	  topics	  could	  possibly	  provide	  the	  development	  assistance	  community	  with	  valuable	  input	  on	  what	  kind	  of	  interventions	  to	  prioritize	  in	  order	  to	  further	  lower	  the	  prevalence	  of	  undernourishment	  in	  the	  world	  and	  finally	  reach	  the	  first	  MDG	  and	  other	  future	  targets	  related	  to	  food,	  hunger	  and	  nutrition.	  Although	  international	  food	  security	  organizations	  and	  initiatives	  to	  some	  extent	  have	  acknowledged	  the	  role	  of	  governance,	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  the	  most	  effective	  hunger	  reducing	  actions,	  this	  study	  has	  hopefully	  offered	  valuable	  information	  on	  what	  kind	  of	  governance	  to	  focus	  on	  in	  order	  to	  fit	  all	  the	  people	  of	  this	  world	  by	  the	  global	  dinner	  table.	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Appendix	  1.	  	  Table	  1.	  Countries	  included	  in	  the	  analysis.	  	  	  	  
Afghanistan Croatia Libya Senegal 
Albania Cuba Lithuania Serbia 
Angola Djibouti Madagascar Seychelles 
Antigua and Barbuda Dominica Malawi Sierra Leone 
Argentina Dominican Republic Maldives Singapore 
Armenia Ecuador Marshall Islands Solomon Islands 
Bahamas El Salvador Mauritania Somalia 
Bahrain Equatorial Guinea Mexico Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh Eritrea Micronesia St Kitts and Nevis 
Barbados Ethiopia (1993-) Moldova St Lucia 
Belarus Fiji Mongolia 
St Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Belize Gambia Montenegro Sudan (-2011) 
Benin Georgia Morocco Suriname 
Bhutan Ghana Mozambique Syria 
Bolivia Grenada Myanmar Taiwan 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Guatemala Namibia Tajikistan 
Botswana Guinea Nauru Tanzania 
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Nepal Thailand 
Brunei Guyana Nicaragua Timor-Leste 
Bulgaria Haiti Niger Togo 
Burkina Faso Honduras Nigeria Tonga 
Burundi India Oman 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
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Cambodia Indonesia Pakistan (1971-) Turkey 
Cameroon Iran Palau Tuvalu 






Chad Kenya Peru Uruguay 
Chile Kiribati Philippines Uzbekistan 
China Korea, North Qatar Vanuatu 
Colombia Kuwait Romania Venezuela 
Comoros Kyrgyzstan Russia Vietnam 
Congo Laos Rwanda Yemen 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic 
Latvia Samoa Zambia 
Costa Rica Lesotho 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Zimbabwe 
Cote d'Ivoire Liberia Panama  	  Note:	  The	  countries	  have	  been	  derived	  from	  the list of developing/emerging countries 
according to the 
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Appendix	  2.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  and	  diagnostics.	  	  Table	  1.	  Descriptive	  statistics	  of	  all	  variables.	  	  
  N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
PoU 100 0,72 1,84 1,2826 0,2839 
Democracy 154 0 10 5,9384 2,97926 
CPI 146 1,01 9,2 3,3034 1,45569 
Poverty 79 0 87,72 19,7985 24,3434 
Population 152 9806 1331379968 37725628,85 147813014,7 
Trade Freedom 142 0 90 70,9577 12,96459 
Infrastructure 107 1,89 6,54 3,9325 0,97783 
Political Stability  154 -3,32 1,46 -0,2571 0,98034 
	  Table	  2.	  Correlation	  between	  the	  independent	  variables.	  	  
  Democracy CPI 























*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001	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Table	  3.	  Multicollinearity	  -­‐	  VIF	  and	  tolerance	  values.	  	  
  Tolerance VIF 
Freedom House/Imputed Polity 0,713 1,402 
Corruption Perceptions Index 0,527 1,898 
GDP per Capita, PPP (Constant International USD) 0,694 1,441 	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  Figure	  1.	  Distribution	  of	  errors	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  before	  log10	  transformation	  
	  Figure	  2.	  Distribution	  of	  errors	  on	  the	  dependent	  variable	  after	  log10	  transformation	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 Figure	  3.	  Homoscedacticity	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  
	  
